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ABSTRACT 
PETER NORBERT GENGLER: “Exhibiting Antifascism: Ravensbrück and the 
Ambivalences of East German Commemoration, 1945-1989” 
(Under the direction of Konrad H. Jarausch) 
 
This thesis examines the political messages enshrined in and transmitted by the 
Ravensbrück women’s concentration camp memorial in the former German Democratic 
Republic between 1945 and 1989. I argue that the ideology displayed at the site was the 
product of contestation and streamlining during the 1950s between the regime and 
intellectuals. Initially after the war, the memorial practices at the site varied and were not 
overtly political. By 1959, the regime successfully monopolized and instrumentalized the 
history of the camp, setting in stone an official narrative that upheld the legitimacy of the 
East German state but excluded the voices of the vast majority of victims. However, a 
“subjective” antifascism that was at odds with the master narrative pushed for a 
pluralization of public memory, particularly in the 1980s. Thus, a wider range of victim 
groups, hitherto ignored or marginalized, were accommodated room next to the glorified 
communist prisoners.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The quaint village of Fürstenberg/Havel, a one-time popular spa retreat in the 
early 20th century, lies about 75 kilometers northwest of Berlin in the idyllic Brandenburg 
landscape of dark forests and tranquil lakes. The serenity belies a pivotal episode in 
history that occurred across the Schwedtsee Lake from the town. Between 1939 and 
1945, the Nazi regime imprisoned more than 130,000 individuals from across occupied 
Europe in Konzentrationslager Ravensbrück, the largest women’s concentration camp on 
German Reich soil; 30,000 women never lived to see liberation by the Red Army on 
April 30, 1945.  
Given the relative solitude of the grounds today, the immense significance of 
Ravensbrück in the postwar period is perhaps surprising. In 1959, the German 
Democratic Republic declared the former concentration camp a national memorial of 
East Germany. From this point onward, millions of visitors streamed here, attending mass 
rallies and commemoration ceremonies organized by the regime.1 The memorial 
developed into an important site of commemoration, becoming a quasi pilgrimage 
destination. In this regard, Ravensbrück differed little from Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen, the other national memorials of the GDR.  
                                                
1 According to a report compiled by the director, between 1959 and 1981 over 3.5 million individuals had 
visited Ravensbrück. It must be emphasized, however, that these numbers are very high because the regime 
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Nevertheless, Ravensbrück differed from other memorials. To begin with, not 
much could be seen at the site; the Soviet military used the former camp until 1992 as a 
depot, so that only the crematorium and prison building, along with a small area along the 
camp wall, could be accessed by visitors. Moreover, Sachsenhausen—on the same rail 
line as Ravensbrück—was much closer to Berlin and more convenient to travel to. Above 
all, Ravensbrück stands apart from other memorials because it was a former women’s 
camp. The memorial therefore took on a unique form and attracted an audience with a 
high percentage of women. Ravensbrück’s distinctiveness might explain why throughout 
the memorial’s existence, it was less highly regarded by both the regime and the East 
German public.2 The male inmates who left Buchenwald and entered into politics took 
center stage, while the women occupied a respected yet nevertheless ambivalent position 
in GDR memory culture. 
Nevertheless, despite standing in the shadows of Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen, 
Ravensbrück also served the important role of acting as a presentation site for the politics 
of East German Antifaschismus, or “antifascism.” The ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) 
transmitted political messages and attempted to shape the socialist worldview of the 
citizens of the GDR by fostering this ideology. The national memorials and museums 
enshrined the communist inmates and glorified their resistance to fascism. Their sacrifice 
served as the foundation for a socialist Germany and justified the regime’s policies as the 
fulfillment of the resistance’s legacy. Antifascism thus legitimized the existence of the 
GDR. Moreover, understanding fascism in economic terms enabled antifascism to reject 
                                                
2 Sigrid Jacobeit, Interview by author, Berlin, Germany, July 3, 2012. There are no documents chronicling 
this, but former memorial staff and historians have privately felt that the gender aspect explains the 
disproportionate interested allocated to Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen. 
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the Federal Republic of Germany and its Western allies; because of their capitalist 
system, they were nothing more than derivatives of fascism. The memorials of the GDR, 
therefore, played an important role in presenting and reinforcing this tremendously 
important ideology that formed the moral and political basis of the East German state.  
Although generally speaking this rhetoric lasted until the collapse of the East 
German state, beginning in the late 1970s a differentiation of commemoration can be 
traced at Ravensbrück. Although the strict boundaries of the “permissible” still existed, 
the memorial and those administering it afforded more room to previously ignored or 
dismissed topics that the regime’s antifascism had marginalized. Analyzing the 
development and establishment of Ravensbrück’s political messages—particularly 
antifascism—from the earliest forms of commemoration to the time immediately before 
the collapse of the East German state yields new insights into GDR memory culture.  
A number of questions when considering this topic stand out. First, what 
messages did the Ravensbrück memorial transmit, how were they formed, and how did 
they change? The state propagated an antifascist narrative that legitimized its rule. Their 
version, however, initially needed to overcome competing voices. The establishment of 
the Ravensbrück memorial was crucial to the regime’s enshrinement of its brand of 
antifascism. Not until creeping reforms in the 1980s would a pluralized memory culture 
emerge and significantly challenge official doctrine. 
 Second, how did the memorial account for Ravensbrück’s unique status as a 
woman’s concentration camp, how were the experiences of the prisoners portrayed, and 
did this change? On the one hand, the function of the memorial did not differ from those 
at male camps; the antifascist message and the praising of members of the communist 
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resistance was the hallmark of all East German memorials. On the other hand, 
Ravensbrück projected a gendered antifascist narrative directed at a feminine audience. 
Moreover, the memorial and its museum differed significantly from the male camps in 
form; in the 1980s, new histories tried to capture the breadth of women’s experiences in 
the camp that went beyond the memorial’s rigid and gendered portrayals.  
Lastly, from where did the impulses of reform emanate, how were they promoted, 
and where did limits remain? Intellectuals who subscribed to a “subjective” antifascism 
constructively criticized the official narrative in order to improve it. Commemorating 
diverse victim groups—such as Jews, Sinti and Roma, non-political prisoners, and 
members of non-communist parties—allowed for a “better” socialism. But much of the 
pressure for change emenated from abroad as well. As the GDR pursued a normalization 
of relations with the West, the door to cultural exchange opened, ushering in an era of 
reform that enabled the pluralization of memory at Ravensbrück. 
Any assessment of Ravensbrück, the GDR’s memory culture, and East German 
antifascism inherently must contend with the various interpretations of what this now 
defunct state actually was.3 For those proponents who endorse an understanding of the 
GDR as an Unrechtsstaat or “unjust state,” focusing on the repressive nature of this 
dictatorship enables a strong moral condemnation of the unquestionably inhumane 
aspects of the GDR.4 Furthermore the totalitarian model typically discredits socialism, 
                                                
3 For an overview of the literature, see Corey Ross, The East German Dictatorship  : Problems and 
Perspectives in the Interpretation of the GDR (London: Arnold, 2002). For an overview of the recent 
debates on GDR history, see Martin Sabrow et al., Wohin treibt die DDR-Erinnerung? Dokumentation 
einer Kontroverse (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2007). 
4 See Horst Möller, “Der SED-Staat—die zweite Diktatur in Deutschland,” in Das Lexikon des DDR-
Sozialismus: Das Staats- und Gesellschaftssystem der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, ed. Rainer 
Eppelmann et al. (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1996); Klaus Schroeder, Der SED-Staat. Partei, Staat und 
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relativizing its emancipatory ambitions. This includes the ideology of Antifaschismus or 
“antifascism,” one of the core founding principles upon which the GDR’s legitimacy 
rested. Critics dismissed this worldview as nothing more than a dictatorial decree meant 
to bolster SED.5 Moreover, these critics contend, antifascism promoted a selective 
historical narrative that rested on exaggeration and distortion, thus preventing a serious 
coming to terms with the legacy of the Third Reich.6 
These criticisms have been countered by those who seek to justify, relativize, or 
excuse the GDR’s shortcomings and humanitarian transgressions and uphold the 
achievements of socialism, including antifascism.7 Some historians defend “decreed 
antifascism” as a more desirable alternative than no antifascism at all, while others admit 
deficits in the transmittal of the ideology, but that this in and of itself should not call for a 
categorical rejection.8 More partisan pundits disavow any shortcomings of the antifascist 
historical narrative of the GDR, decrying the post reunification renovation of the former 
                                                                                                                                            
Gesellschaft 1949-1980 (München: Hanser, 1998); and Eckhard Jesse, Totalitarismus Im 20. Jahrhundert  : 
Eine Bilanz der internationalen Forschung (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 1999). 
5 The term “decreed antifascism” was coined by Ralph Giordano. See Ralph Giordano, Die zweite Schuld 
oder Von der Last, Deutscher zu sein (Hamburg: Rasch und Röhring, 1987). See also Wilfried Schubarth et 
al., “Verordneter Antifaschismus und die Folgen. Das Dilemma antifaschistischer Erziehung am Ende der 
DDR,” in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 9 (1991): 3-16; Antonia Grunenberg, Antifaschismus—ein 
deutscher Mythos (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1993); and Hans-Helmuth Knütter, Die Faschismus-
Keule. Das letzte Aufgebot der deutschen Linken (Frankfurt a.M.: Ullstein, 1993). 
6 See Olaf Groehler, “Antifaschismus—vom Umgang mit einem Begriff,” in Zweierlei Bewältigung. Vier 
Beiträge über den Umgang mit der NS-Vergangenheit in den beiden deutschen Staaten, ed. Ulrich Herbert 
et al. (Hamburg: Ergebnisse Verlag 1992), 29-40. 
7 See most recently Ralph Hartmann, DDR-Legenden. Der Unrechtsstaat, der Schieβbefehl und die marode 
Wirtschaft (Berlin: Edition Ost, 2009). 
8 See Kurt Gossweiler, “Rückschau auf Begegnungen und Debatten”, in Rassismus, Faschismus, 
Antifaschismus, ed. Manfred Weiβbecker et al. (Köln: PapyRossa Verlag, 2000), 461-474. See also Kurt 
Pätzold, “Die Legende vom ‘verordneten Antifaschismus’”, in Ansichten zur Geschichte der DDR, vol. 3, 
ed. Hans Modrow, et al., (Eggersdorf: M. Kirchner, 1994), 111-130. 
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East German memorials and removal of the political messages as a second “murder” of 
the antifascist heroes.9  
 A growing body of nuanced scholarship has attempted to capture both the 
repressive reality of the East German dictatorship and the emancipatory ambitions of 
socialism.10 Despite coining differing terms that emphasize various aspects of the state’s 
rule, these studies share the notion that the historicization of the GDR must account for 
paradoxes and ambivalences.11 This includes a differentiated assessment of antifascism. 
The state-propagated Antifaschismus has rightly been criticized as stale and overly 
ritualized, unable to foster a strong identification among GDR citizens with the values of 
the ruling party. Moreover, the antifascism as transmitted by the regime could not enable 
a deep historical understanding of the Third Reich and its causes, as it contained too 
many blind spots and silences on topics deemed subversive or “inconvenient” to the East 
German leadership. However, this “official” antifascism often differed from the 
convictions of intellectuals.12 Their antifascism, which had a tremendous moral and 
intellectual force, lingered  longer among these individuals and could motivate criticism 
                                                
9 Monika Zorn, ed, Hitlers zweimal getöte Opfer. Westdeutsche Endlösung des Antifaschismus auf dem 
Gebiet der DDR (Freiburg: Ahriman-Verlag, 2001). 
10 This has been forcefully enunciated by Konrad H. Jarausch et al., Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a 
Socio-Cultural History of the GDR (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999).     
11 See for instance Jürgen Kocka, “Eine durchherrschte Gesellschaft,” in Sozialgeschichte der DDR, ed. 
Hartmut Kaelble et al. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1994), 547-553; Jarausch, "Care and Coercion: The GDR as 
Welfare Dictatorship," in Jarausch et al., Dictatorship as Experience, 47-69; Martin Sabrow, Das Diktat 
des Konsens. Geschichtswissenschaft in der DDR 1949-1969 (München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2001); 
Richard Bessel and Ralf Jesse, Die Grenzen der Diktatur: Staat und Gesellschaft in der DDR (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996). 
12 For a nuanced discussion of antifascism, see Jarausch, “The Failure of East German Antifascism: Some 
Ironies of History as Politics,” in German Studies Review Vol. 14, No. 1 (Feb., 1991): 85-102; and Jürgen 
Danyel, “Antifaschismus und Verdrängung. Zum Umgang mit der NS-Vergangenheit in der DDR,” in Die 
DDR als Geschichte: Fragen, Hypothese, Perspektiven, ed. Jürgen Kocka et al. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 
1994), 148-152. 
 
 
7 
 
of the regime—not necessarily in the name of dissent but with the intention of creating a 
“better” socialism.13 In other words, there were many facets of antifascism “below” the 
“nationalized memory” of the GDR, particularly in the final years of the state’s 
existence.14  
This differentiated assessment of antifascism as a basic framework allows for a 
fresh analysis of the documentary evidence at Ravensbrück. Although there have been a 
handful of studies chronicling the postwar history of the site and the development of the 
memorial, none have departed significantly from the “decreed antifascism” 
interpretation.15 These monographs, written after 1990, depict Ravensbrück as dominated 
by the SED, which strictly controlled the political messages of the site. Certainly there is 
no denying the primacy of the state; final authority rested with the party. However, 
discursive analysis and a critical reading of the documentary evidence in the Ravensbrück 
archive and the German Federal Archive in Berlin complicates assumptions and adds 
breadth to the generic “decreed antifascism” utilized by historians of the memorial.  
The SED forged East German antifascism in the face of contestation in the early 
postwar period, before it became official state doctrine. Moreover, the evidence suggests 
                                                
13 See for instance David Bathrick, The Powers of Speech: the Politics of Culture in the GDR (Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1995); Simone Barck, Antifa-Geschichte(n). Eine literarische Spurensuche 
in der DDR der 1950er und 1960er Jahre (Köln: Böhlau, 2003); Jon Berndt Olsen, “Tailoring truth: 
Memory culture and state legitimacy in East Germany, 1945-1989” (PhD diss., University of North 
Carolina-Chapel Hill, 2004). 
14 Jürgen Danyel, ed., Die geteilte Vergangenheit. Zum Umgang mit Nationalsozialismus und Widerstand in 
beiden deutschen Staaten (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), 39. 
15 See Insa Eschenbach, Sigrid Jacobeit, and Susanne Lanwerd, eds., Die Sprache des Gedenkens. Zur 
Geschichte der Gedenkstätte Ravensbrück 1945-1995 (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 1999); and Petra Frank and 
Stefan Hördler, eds., Der Nationalsozialismus im Spiegel des öffentlichen Gedächtnisses. Formen der 
Aufarbeitung und des Gedenkens (Berlin: Metropol, 2005). For similar studies on other GDR memorials, 
see Günter Morsch, ed., Von der Erinnerung zum Monument: die Enstehungsgeschichte der Nationalen 
Mahn- und Gedenkstätte Sachsenhausen (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 1996); Manfred Overesch, Buchenwald 
und die DDR: oder die Suche nach Selbstlegitimation (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995). 
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pushes for changes in the narrative enshrined in the memorial and museum “from below” 
from Ravensbrück staff and mid-level functionaries in the government itself. These 
impulses stemmed from a “subjective” antifascism that relied on a broader historical 
understanding that tolerated ideological nuances. Previous studies have largely ignored 
the dynamism and ambivalences of a multifaceted antifascism that operated below the 
state level. 
Besides leaving the term “antifascism” largely undifferentiated, previous studies 
of Ravensbrück and other former GDR memorials have continuously stressed the 
shortcomings of the site vis-à-vis “white spots,” or taboo chapters of history.16 It would 
go too far to surmise that these authors subscribe to the totalitarian model, but certainly 
the major thrust of the narratives concentrate on the repression of memory and the 
instrumentalization of the GDR’s memorials for political purposes. Again, this cannot be 
categorically denied; ultimately, the memorials in East Germany failed to adequately 
commemorate many millions of individuals belonging to diverse victim groups.17 
However, the same sources these authors have used to illustrate how the regime 
controlled the master narrative at Ravensbrück also reveal contestations that have been 
overlooked or dismissed. They suggest attempts at liberalization and pluralization, 
however halted and limited, particularly in the waning years of the GDR. Investigating 
this development sheds a new light on the supposed rigid and uncompromising memory 
culture of East Germany, as well as those constructing and shaping it. 
                                                
16 Hermann Weber, “Die ‘weiβen Flecken’ in der Geschichte,” in Aufbau und Fall einer Diktatur. Kritische 
Beiträge zur Geschichte der DDR, ed. Hermann Weber (Köln: Bund Verlag, 1991). 
17 As will become clear, the official antifascism of the memorials privileged communist prisoners and 
ignored Jews, Sinti and Roma, Jehovah’s Witnesses, criminals, the “asocial,” homosexuals, Christians, and 
members of bourgeois parties. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RAVENSBRÜCK CONCENTRATION CAMP AND 
THE STREAMLINING OF MEMORY, 1939-1959 
 
To understand the significance of Ravensbrück’s prominence and importance in 
the postwar period, a brief history of the camp during the years 1939 and 1945 is 
necessary.18 Who was imprisoned there, the functions of the camp, and the scale of the 
site had profound influences on the future memory of this history. Moreover, a broad 
overview underlines the character of East German commemoration, especially regarding 
its deficiencies.  
In 1939 the SS came to the conclusion that various female detention centers 
should be closed and merged into a single concentration camp dedicated to imprisoning 
women. In May of that year, the first prisoners were transferred to Ravensbrück, 
designed—as were all of Germany’s concentration camps—along the guidelines and 
model pioneered at Dachau, the first concentration camp built in March of 1933.19 By 
1945, more than 130,000 women would find themselves imprisoned in the main camp or 
one of its more than forty Aussenlager or sub-camps. In addition, beginning in the spring 
                                                
18 For more in-depth overviews, see Sigrid Jacobeit and Lieselotte Thoms-Heinrich, eds., Kreuzweg 
Ravensbrück: Lebensbilder antifaschistischer Widerstandskampferinnen (Leipzig: Verlag für die Frau, 
1987); Jacobeit et al., Forschungsschwerpunkt Ravensbrück: Beiträge zur Geschichte des Frauen-
Konzentrationslagers (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 1997); Claus Füllberg-Stolberg, Frauen in 
Konzentrationslagern: Bergen-Belsen, Ravensbrück (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1994); and Bernhard 
Strebel, “Ravensbrück—das zentrale Frauenkonzentrationslager,” in Die nationalsozialistischen 
Konzentrationslager. Entwicklung und Struktur. Band I, ed. Ulrich Herbert et al. (Göttingen: Wallstein, 
1998), 215-258. 
19 The significant difference at Ravensbrück, however, was that the camp would be guarded by female SS 
auxiliary. Typically, only these women were allowed to enter the camp, although the perimeter guards and 
the camp administration were male SS personnel.  
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of 1941, authorities established a small male facility within the main complex; around 
20,000 men would be imprisoned here during the war. About a year later, the 
Ravensbrück command built Jugendschutzlager (youth protective custody camp) 
Uckermarck to the southeast. Here, over 1,000 girls aged 16 to 21 faced detention for 
criminal or “unruly” behavior. Thus, by the spring of 1942 Ravensbrück had become a 
sizeable and important part of the Nazi concentration camp system. 
 The first prisoners came from Germany. Most of these initial detainees were 
incarcerated for political reasons, either because they had been active in the opposition to 
the Nazi party or were married to an individual targeted by the regime. Criminals, 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, homosexuals, and the “asocial”20 also faced imprisonment in 
Ravensbrück. A small minority of women at this stage was Jewish, imprisoned for their 
politics as opposed to their ethnicity; virtually all of these were murdered or deported to 
death camps after 1942.21 After the outbreak of war in 1939, the prisoner population 
began to reflect the number of nations the German army had conquered. Polish and 
Russian prisoners constituted the majority of the non-German population, but the SS 
imprisoned the citizens of 40 nations, including a handful of British and American 
                                                
20 This blanket term included Roma and Sinti, the “work-shy,” women who had changed sexual partners 
frequently, and so-called “race defilers,” or women accused of relations with members of an inferior race. 
21 The majority of Jewish prisoners at Ravensbrück, in fact, were murdered as part of “Aktion 14f13,” an 
extension of the adult euthanasia program. The goal of the action aimed at euthanizing Germany’s 
concentration camp prisoners, particularly those who had become too weak and emaciated to work, were 
mentally “feeble-minded,” asthmatic, and even those who had wet their beds. The policy, however, also 
included all Jewish prisoners within the camp system, regardless of their health. Several hundred 
Ravensbrück Jews, along with between 1,200-1,600 other prisoners, were gassed at the mental institute 
Bernburg near Dessau. For more on 14f13, see Ernst Klee, “Euthanasie” im NS-Staat: die “Vernichtung 
lebensunwerten Lebens” (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer, 1983). For a specific study of the Ravensbrück 
inmates and 14f13, see Anise Postel-Vinay, “Gaskammern und die Ermordung durch Gas im 
Konzentrationslager Ravensbrück,” in Forschungsschwerpunkt Ravensbrück, ed. Jacobeit (Berlin: Edition 
Hentrich, 1997), 33-46. 
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women, in Ravensbrück.22 Membership in the communist party, as well as participation 
in the resistance or opposition to the German occupying forces, sealed the fate of 
thousands of European women. 
The primary function of Ravensbrück was economic. Several workshops within 
the camp produced uniforms and other materials vital for the war effort. In addition, 
Siemens constructed a factory just south of the main camp, drawing labor from the 
prisoner population. The various sub-camps, built around local industry and agricultural 
enterprises, were vital components of the Third Reich’s wartime economy. Ravensbrück 
also served as the central training center for the female SS auxiliary forces. Most of the 
over 3,500 female guards—some of whom would earn notoriety for their barbarity at 
Auschwitz and Majdanek—lived and trained here.23  
 In the final phase of the war, the situation in the camp changed dramatically. 
Once Russian military gains threatened camps in the East, the SS closed these facilities 
and transferred prisoners westward. Ravensbrück thus became a transit camp, as the 
population swelled with newly arrived, predominantly Jewish prisoners. These 
developments led to extreme overcrowding, atrocious sanitary conditions, and 
exacerbated the strain on the already meager food supplies, so that the death toll rose 
drastically. Furthermore, the SS transferred the killing process from Auschwitz to 
Ravensbrück, when in early 1945 the camp administration erected a provisional gas 
chamber. In April of 1945, Folke Bernadotte of the Swedish Red Cross successfully 
negotiated the release of 7,500 prisoners. The majority of prisoners however suffered the 
                                                
22 Polish prisoners would even outnumber German inmates after 1939. 
23 For more on the female guards, see Simone Erpel, Im Gefolge der SS: Aufseherinnen des Frauen-KZ 
Ravensbrück: Begleitband zur Ausstellung (Berlin: Metropol, 2007). 
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precarious conditions of the collapsing Third Reich until in late April of 1945, the SS 
forced all able-bodied prisoners onto death marches away from the encroaching enemy; 
only 3,500 sick women and children remained to see liberation by the Red Army on April 
30, 1945. 
British estimates after the war judged that about 92,000 prisoners did not survive, 
but more recent studies attribute the number of victims between 25,000 and 40,000.24 The 
range in these figures can be largely attributed to the chaos of the final months of the war. 
The transfers from Auschwitz, which were not adequately recorded, faced the most 
deplorable conditions, therefore succumbing to disease and malnutrition. Moreover, 
unknown thousands perished on the death marches, complicating a final tally. In either 
case, Ravensbrück’s size and death toll place it in the same league as the more notorious 
camps on German soil.25 Nevertheless, the history of the Holocaust and Nazi dictatorship 
often overlooks this camp in the tranquil Brandenburg countryside.  
Postwar memorialization thus needed to contend with a major concentration camp 
in which a wide range of operations and activities occurred. Almost immediately after 
liberation, commemoration and remembering of the dead began at Ravensbrück. This 
revolved around caring for the remains and the graves of the deceased. Working 
voluntarily, a number of survivors organized the burial of the dead in several mass graves 
around the former camp. The local population, compelled by Russian troops, did most of 
                                                
24 Stefan Hördler, who has conducted extensive research on Ravensbrück, estimates that about 28,000 
women perished at the camp. This figure does not include the many thousands who died on the so-called 
“death marches” in the final days of the war, when the SS evacuated the camp of all prisoners able to walk. 
It also does not factor in deaths of women who had been transferred to other camps or satellite facilities and 
perished there. Stefan Hördler, “Die Schlussphase des Konzentrationslagers Ravensbrück. Personalpolitik 
und Vernichtung,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 56 (2008), 247. 
25 For instance, according to SS records, about 33,000 prisoners died in Buchenwald. It is estimated that 
around 30,000 men died in Sachsenhausen, the third national memorial in the GDR. This matches the toll at 
the major camp in West Germany, Dachau, where just over 31,000 victims are thought to have perished.  
 
 
13 
 
the physical labor involved with the interment of the victims. Furthermore, an order from 
the Russian authorities obligated the community of Fürstenberg to tend and maintain the 
graves.26 
This early phase of the site before the founding of the German Democratic 
Republic was marked by ad hoc measures and relative indifference on the part of the 
local populace and the Russian forces.27 When beginning in 1947 organizations such as 
the Opfer des Faschismus (Victims of Fascism) and Vereinigung der Verfolgten des 
Naziregimes (Union of Persecutees of the Nazi Regime) became involved at 
Ravensbrück, a more formal site of remembrance began to develop. These organizations 
tended the graves, maintained the site, and planned the first memorial celebrations. It had 
become clear, however, that for the time being the preservation of the area and honoring 
of the dead would fall to a small group of individuals. Former prisoners expressed shock 
at the dilapidated state of the site. Buildings had fallen into disrepair or had even been 
dismantled for material by scavengers and Russian troops, who had converted the former 
camp into a military depot. Only the crematorium, outside of the camp wall and therefore 
outside of the Russian base, provided a feasible focal point for a future memorial.28  
One of the first steps toward a formal site of commemoration began in 1948, 
when the surrounding graveyards were exhumed as part of a process of searching for 
                                                
26 For more on this early phase, see Insa Eschenbach, “Zur Formensprache der Totenehrung. Ravensbrück 
in der frühen Nachkriegszeit,” in Die Sprache des Gedenkens. Zur Geschichte der Gedenkstätte 
Ravensbrück 1945-1995, ed. Sigrid Jacobeit et al. (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 1999), 14-20. 
27 For the ambivalent attitudes of the local population, see Annette Leo, “Das ist so’n zweischneiidiges 
Schwert hier unser KZ…” Der Fürstenberger Alltag und das Frauenkonzentrationslager Ravensbrück 
(Berlin: Metropol, 2007). 
28 For more on this early history, see Eschenbach, “Zur Formensprache der Totenehrung”; Erika Schwarz 
and Simone Steppan, “Die Entstehung der Nationalen Mahn- und Gedenkstätte Ravensbrück, 1945-1959,” 
in Die Sprache des Gedenkens. Zur Geschichte der Gedenkstätte Ravensbrück 1945-1995, ed. Sigrid 
Jacobeit et al. (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 1999), 218-239. 
 
 
14 
 
missing persons; the more than 300 remains were all reburied together along the camp 
wall by the crematorium, which had become the clear staging area around which a site of 
memory would be built. How and why the decision to gather together all the dead into a 
single grave remains unknown. It is significant, however, as whereas before the graves—
even if they were mass graves—had been designed to at least look individualized, now 
the final resting place had taken on a martial air. This indicates a shift in memorial 
practice from individualized memory to something quite different. As George Mosse has 
pointed out, by declining individual grave inscriptions at military cemeteries, the primacy 
of the nation over the individual comes to full expression.29 In other words, these places 
become central sites of national commemoration. Frank Kämpfer asserts that the mass 
grave shrouds the victims in anonymity in order to accentuate the values of society, even 
if this is at the expense of remembering individual fates.30 This certainly is the case at 
Ravensbrück, where from this point onward the site increasingly celebrated the socialist 
values of the “new” German nation. Moreover, the fate of the prisoners served as an 
idealized model of socialist behavior for the rest of the population to follow. It inculcated 
notions of responsibility to advance socialism in order to honor the sacrifice of the 
departed, a hallmark of the first provisional memorials in the late 1940s. 
 Besides tending to the physical location, the VVN took it upon itself to document 
the history of Ravensbrück. Thus in May of 1947, the international council of the 
                                                
29 George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1990). 
30 Frank Kämpfer, “Vom Massengrab zum Heroenhügel. Akkulturationsfunktionen sowjetischer 
Kriegsdenkmäler,” in Der politische Totenkult. Kriegerdenkmäler in der Moderne, ed. Reinhart Koselleck 
et al. (München: Fink, 1994), 327-349. 
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organization decided to establish local and regional research branches.31 Although the 
VVN operated throughout postwar Germany, the political differences among the 
members and the emerging Cold War became increasingly palpable within the 
association. Because the majority of the members were also members of the Communist 
Party of Germany (KPD), the VVN’s research primarily focused on the history of the 
German resistance—increasingly understood as the activities of the KPD—therefore 
seems hardly surprising. Engaged lay historians concentrated on the experiences of 
“fighters against fascism,” as well as the accomplishments of communist prisoners within 
the camp system. Of course, the recording of eye-witness accounts and experiences was 
very important, particularly in creating a record that could serve as evidence in postwar 
criminal trials of former SS personnel. This was particularly complicated at Ravensbrück, 
as the SS destroyed virtually all of the administrative records in the crematorium before 
evacuating the camp. Without daily reports, prisoner rosters, and various other relevant 
materials, the VVN’s engagement proved vital to the immediate postwar histories of the 
camp. It also, however, typically excluded the histories of other prisoners who were not 
of the same political persuasion, or simply did not fit the communist narrative. 
 Much of the indifference to non-communist prisoners on the part of the 
organizations that came to dominate the early historicization and commemoration of 
Ravensbrück echoes the ambivalence within the Soviet Occupation Zone toward a wide 
number of prisoner groups. Deep misgivings toward prisoners classified as “criminal” 
and “asocial” by the Nazis persisted. Members imprisoned because of Christian or 
“bourgeois” opposition fared better, but their plight ranked as “second” to that of the 
                                                
31 Schwarz and Steppan, “Die Entstehung der Nationalen Mahn- und Gedenkstätte Ravensbrück”, 221. 
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political left. Those persecuted because of their membership in the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD) generally enjoyed respect, but the red triangle, symbolizing the political 
prisoner, increasingly represented solely communist prisoners. Above all, public debate 
revolved around how Jewish prisoners should be regarded, and whether their suffering 
could be included within the category of “resistance.” Furthermore, disagreements over 
whether Jews even qualified as “victims of fascism” emerged. This contestation revolved 
around moral and material concerns; individuals awarded this title received pensions, 
special privileges, as well as social prestige.32  
A myriad of reasons explain the GDR’s reluctance to thoroughly engage with the 
fate of the Jews. Initially, after the Second World War ended, a sense of solidarity among 
liberated concentration camp prisoners suggested that Jewish plight fell under the rubric 
of antifascism. Many communist prisoners who had suffered in the Nazi camp system 
sympathized with and wished for solidarity with Social Democrats and Jewish victims. 
They envisioned a broad antifascist coalition that made room for their fellow prisoners. 
The politician and poet Johannes Becher, author of the lyrics to the East German national 
anthem, became a strong and impassioned early voice for Jewish victims.33 The Jewish 
communist Alfred Kantorowicz argued that the plight of the Jews could not be regarded 
                                                
32 Members of the OdF and the VVN were often split over their support of Jewish victims. For more on this 
see Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory. The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1997), especially chapters 3-5; Susanne zur Nieden, “‘…für das Ansehen der Opfer des Faschismus 
nicht tragbar.’ Auseinanderstetzungen um den Verfolgtenstatus von Minna R., Blockälteste im KZ 
Ravensbrück,” in Die Sprache des Gedenkens. Zur Geschichte der Gedenkstätte Ravensbrück 1945-1995, 
ed. Sigrid Jacobeit et al. (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 1999), 184-195; and Olaf Groehler, “Verfolgten- und 
Opfergruppen im Spannungsfeld der politischen Auseinandersetzungen in der SBZ und DDR,” in Die 
geteilte Vergangenheit. Zum Umgang mit Nationalsozialismus und Widerstand in beiden deutschen 
Staaten, ed. Jürgen Danyel (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995), 17-30. 
33 See for instance Johannes R. Becher, “Deutschland Klagt An!”, Aufbau 1, no. 1 (January 1946), 9-18. 
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as passive; they were essentially fighters and part of the antifascist resistance.34 Other 
proponents included Julius Meyer, Heinz Galinski, Franz Dahlem, and especially Paul 
Merker, a longtime communist active before the war and a member of the Central 
Committee and Politbüro of the SED.35 These critics saw an obligation to Jewish victims 
and called for recognition from the state and restitution to them.36  
Although some Jews attained high-ranking SED positions and enjoyed political 
support among some of their non-Jewish colleagues, a number of factors converged 
which ruled out inclusion of racial victims in GDR memory culture. To begin with, 
Marxism-Leninism and communist scholarship had deep misgivings about “Zionism.” 
Moreover, the SED regarded Jewish “cosmopolitanism” as irreconcilable with socialism 
and dangerously sympathetic to the West. In addition, Stalin’s 1913 treatise opposing the 
Jewish national question ruled out the right for Jews to any special claims as a national 
minority in the Stalinist Eastern Bloc. Furthermore, Cold War politics and the Soviet 
Union’s opposition to the Israeli state made the recognition of Jewish suffering a delicate 
matter. A definite anti-Jewish sentiment descended upon the Eastern Bloc after the 
infamous “Doctors’ Plot” and Slánský show trials.37 Following these actions against 
                                                
34 See Alfred Kantorowicz, “Opfer des Faschismus,“ Die Weltbühne, September 1, 1947, 733-735.  
35 For a more detailed discussion on the activities and positions of communists and the discourse over 
Jewish victims, see Herf, Divided Memory. 
36 See Herf, Divided Memory; Olaf Groehler, “Integration und Ausgrenzung von NS-Opfern: Zur 
Anerkennungs- und Entschädigungsdebatte in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands 1945 bis 
1949,“ in Historische DDR-Forschung: Aufsätze und Studien, ed. Jürgen Kocka (Berlin: Akadamie Verlag, 
1993), 105-127; and Angelika Timm, “Der Streit um Restitution und Widergutmachung in der 
Sowjetischen Besatzungszone Deutschlands,” in Babylon: Beiträge zur jüdischen Gegenwart, nos. 10-11 
(1992): 125-138. 
37 The fabricated “Doctors’ Plot“ refers to the show trials of 1952/53, which followed the uncovering of a 
supposed conspiracy of Moscow doctors, mostly Jewish, who had plotted to murder Soviet leaders. The 
trials and ensuing anti-Semitic propaganda campaigns led to the purging of Soviet Jews from positions of 
influence, as well as a wave of similar actions aimed at Jews throughout the Eastern Bloc. The “Slánský 
Trial,” influenced by the “Doctors’ Plot” trials in the USSR, sentenced a number of Czech communist party 
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perceived “Zionist” threats, countless Jews and Jewish sympathizers were purged from 
communist parties, the bureaucracy, and the military throughout Soviet Eastern Europe. 
By the early 1950s, it had become clear that Jewish life in the German Democratic 
Republic had been profoundly influenced by these political events.38    
With the supporters of Jewish recognition purged or forced to flee to the West, 
streamlining the foundational narrative that glorified the communist resistance and 
excluded the suffering of Jews became an easy matter. The Nazi racial barbarity never 
entirely developed into a taboo, but a clear hierarchy of victims emerged. Non-political 
victims were either remembered only after communist heroes or were lumped together 
under the blanket term “victims of Fascism,” or simply ignored.39  Historians who 
focused too much attention toward the genocide of the Jews faced criticism from peers 
who felt that discussions over Jewish persecution relativized the Nazi terror against 
communist functionaries.40 Even suggesting that Nazi aggression had aimed equally 
against communists and Jews proved problematic. As one historian lamented, detailed 
                                                                                                                                            
members, most of whom were Jewish, to death or long prison sentences. During the course of the trial, Paul 
Merker and Franz Dahlem were named as contacts, which led to their purge from the SED and arrest for 
being “Zionist agents.” Merker would eventually be sentenced to eight years in prison, and only face 
exoneration after his death. 
38 For more on the GDR and its positions towards Judaism, see Herf, Divided Memory; Robin Ostow, 
Jüdisches Leben in der DDR (Frankfurt a.M.: Athenäum, 1988); Siegfried Arndt, ed., Juden in der DDR: 
Geschichte—Probleme—Perspektiven (Sachsenheim: Burg Verlag, 1988); Olaf Groehler, Die SED-Politik, 
der Antifaschismus und die Juden in der SBZ und der frühen DDR (Berlin: Gesellschaftswissenschaftliches 
Forum, 1995); and Mario Keβler, Die SED und die Juden: zwischen Repression und Toleranz: politische 
Entwicklung bis 1967 (Berlin: Akadamie Verlag, 1995). 
39 A complicated classification system of victimhood developed in the GDR. Ultimately, identification 
cards differentiated between “Fighter,” “Persecuted,” and “Partially Persecuted.” 
40 For instance, historians condemened Albert Schreiner’s contribution to a history volume because it 
focused too heavily on Jewish plight. Albert Schreiner, “Disposition für das Hochschullehrbuch der 
Geschichte des deutschen Volkes (1918-1945)”, in Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 2 (1954): 701-
756. 
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discussions over the genocide would make it “appear as if the fight against the Jews was 
worse than it had been against the Communists.”41  
 In any case, the public contestations over who should be included in the 
antifascist narrative and in what form is reflected in the work of the VVN and the 
Ravensbrück Committee. Because of this organizations physical location near the camp, 
requests for information from all over Europe poured in. Survivors applying for 
compensation and recognition needed to have their histories verified; the responsible 
bureaucratic offices in turn wrote the VVN chapters in the Soviet Zone in order to 
corroborate the claims. All too often the destroyed records made this impossible. Instead, 
the Ravensbrück Committee, composed predominantly of former communist prisoners, 
reviewed these requests. They relayed the call for information to their extended network 
of “political witnesses.” Typically the character of the person in question would be 
evaluated, before issuing a reply to the requesting party. Thus, if the network 
remembered and approved of the person, a positive response was issued; if no one could 
place the individual, or worse if the person in question had not worn the red triangle or 
been a Kameradin (comrade), a negative reply ensued, jeopardizing the right to 
compensation and pension.  
The process whereby a self-selected group of like-minded former political 
prisoners vetted inquiries of survivors and then conferred or withheld their approval can 
be illustrated by the case of Ilse Scheder. After having applied for recognition as a victim 
of Nazi persecution for political reasons in Jena, the city council wrote to the VVN 
                                                
41 Cited in Martin Sabrow, “Beherrschte Erinnerung und gebundene Wissenschaft. Überlegungen zur DDR-
Geschichtsschreibung über die Zeit von 1933 bis 1945,” in Erinnerungskulturen. Deutschland, Italien und 
Japan seit 1945, ed. Christoph Corneliβen, Lutz Klinkhammer und Wolfgang Schwentker (Frankfurt am 
Main: Fischer Verlag, 2003), 159. 
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secretariat in Berlin on January 13, 1949 requesting information about the person, 
specifically regarding her conduct in the camp and the reason for her arrest.42 The 
Ravensbrück Committee of the VVN in turn sent out form letters to several “witnesses,” 
known political prisoners who constituted a network of authorities that evaluated these 
petitions. In this particular case, Erika Buchmann—who also led the improvised 
memorial as interim director before 1959—testified that Scheder had “always worn the 
red triangle,” the mark of a political prisoner, and that her conduct had been “comradely 
and very agreeable.”43 In this case, the circle of survivors composing and managing the 
rolls of prisoners corroborated the claims, although they were initially viewed with 
suspicion and skepticism. 
 Inquiries from outside of the Soviet Occupation Zone typically faced a greater 
degree of scrutiny. Although the VVN reached across the various sectors and 
encompassed all of Germany, the members in the Berlin office exhibited a palpable 
ambivalence when answering correspondence from the West. For instance, in December 
of 1948, the Office for Politically and Religiously Persecuted in Hof wrote the 
Ravensbrück Committee requesting information that could confirm the petition of 
Margarete Schiller, who had submitted an application for recognition and reparations as a 
victim persecuted for political reasons. The office provided Schiller’s account, which 
included a list of witnesses, her barracks number, and details of her work assignment in 
                                                
42 Letter from Rat der Universitätsstadt Jena, Sozialamt, Abt. Opfer des Faschismus dated 1/13/49, to VVN 
Sekretariat in Berlin, SAPMO-BArch DY57/1056, unpag. 
43 Letter from Erika Buchmann to the VVN Sekretariat in Berlin dated 9/30/49, SAPMO-BArch 
DY57/1056, unpag. 
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Schneiderei II, the camp’s second tailor workshop.44 The Committee sent out the usual 
information to their network of trusted authorities, none of whom could confirm 
Schiller’s claims. One respondent, who had worked in the camp’s other tailor building, 
not only disavowed knowing Schiller, but questioned the entire story because she herself 
had known “almost everyone” in Schneiderei I and that most of the women in the other 
workshop were “girls” who were imprisoned because of intimate relationships with 
Polish or Czech prisoners of war.45 Based on the limited knowledge and assumptions of a 
prisoner not even in the same workshop, who purported to know “everyone,” the 
Committee responded to Hof that it could not confirm whether Schiller had worn the red 
triangle, but that in all likelihood she had not been a political prisoner but rather a 
criminal. They closed the letter with the invitation for a follow-up, asking Schiller to 
name “political witnesses,” implying that the individuals she had cited were not adequate 
or reliable. Several “well-known” prisoners had worked in Schiller’s workshop, the 
Committee added.46 
 The source material testifies to the fact that for a multitude of inquiries, this was 
the end result. If the Committee could not recall a single woman among the 130,000 
prisoners incarcerated in Ravensbrück during the war, the claimant, from the perspective 
of the Ravensbrück Committee, did not exist or was not a member of the privileged 
network of political prisoners, which was tantamount to non-existence. Moreover, as was 
                                                
44 Letter from Hof a.d. Saale Betreuungsstelle für politisch und religiös Verfolgte to VVN Abteilung 
Frauenkommitee Ravensbrück dated 12/03/48, SAPMO-BArch DY57/1056, unpag 
45 Letter from Olga Körner to Frauenkommitee Ravensbrück dated 01/25/1949, SAPMO-BArch 
DY57/1056, unpag 
46 Letter from Frauenkommitee Ravensbrück to Hof a.d. Saale Betreuungsstelle für politisch und religiös 
Verfolgte dated 02/07/49, SAPMO-BArch DY57/1056, unpag. 
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the case in this instance, if the claimant could not name the handful of camp luminaries 
who in the postwar period composed the prisoner rolls, the experiences and suffering of 
the survivor were questioned and denied, thereby threatening the claims to material and 
social recognition.  
Margarete Schiller, however, could count herself fortunate, as the authorities in 
Hof responded vehemently with a sharply-worded letter in which they expressed their 
“disaffection” toward the Committee’s reply. According to their information, Schiller 
could never have been a criminal prisoner; she came from an old Social Democrat family, 
her father had been a union functionary, and in Hof she was a valued member of the 
community and did not possess a criminal record, before or after the war. Furthermore, 
they provided detailed records of her arrest and conviction, listed as “communist 
sympathies and listening to Radio London,” which they regarded as a political act. They 
closed the letter with exasperation, as in their opinion the long list of witnesses that 
Schiller had provided seemed comprehensive.47 The Committee responded defensively, 
back-tracking and denying that they accused Schiller of being a criminal, but rather 
pointed to the unfortunate reality that the SS had destroyed all records, complicating 
verification.48 After a long back and forth in which the Hof authorities insisted upon 
Schiller’s version of events, the Committee finally corroborated the story. The confusion, 
they imparted to Hof, stemmed from the fact that one of the witnesses that Schiller had 
mentioned had confused her with someone else, and that Schiller could now be 
recognized as a known political prisoner whose “political disposition was beyond 
                                                
47 Letter from Hof a.d. Saale Betreuungsstelle für politisch und religiös Verfolgte to Frauenkommitee 
Ravensbrück dated  03/03/49, SAPMO-BArch DY57/1056, unpag. 
48 Letter from Frauenkommitee Ravensbrück to Hof a.d. Saale Betreuungsstelle für politisch und religiös 
Verfolgte dated  03/05/49, SAPMO-BArch DY57/1056, unpag. 
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reproach.”49 Had it not been for the admirable and persistent intervention of the Office 
for Politically and Religiously Persecuted, the selective and presumptuous imaginings of 
the partisan Ravensbrück Committee would have stood as the historic reality, bringing 
with it very real and serious consequences for a survivor depending on recognition and 
material compensation. 
 The public discourse over who should be regarded as a “proper” victim of Nazi 
barbarity certainly finds reflection here. However, just as important and plausible, the 
activities of this small handful of women of the Ravensbrück Committee—who now 
“controlled” the site and gathered information on it and the prisoner population—laid the 
groundwork for the future narrative of the camp’s history that the memorial would 
enshrine. These women had written “their” past and selectively created a history of the 
resistance movement that the future memorial could easily seize upon. Moreover, the 
conundrum of the destroyed camp files presented concrete problems to be sure, but also a 
convenient opportunity; the missing evidence that could have laid bare the scope of 
Ravensbrück did not exist and therefore could not contradict the imaginings of the 
survivors recreating the history of the camp. In other words, a reimagining of the camp 
was made possible, through which the communist gate-keepers could repopulate the 
barracks with “their” women and take their experiences as the standard for all the women 
in the camp. This had a profound impact on the contours of East German memory 
culture, before the 1949 founding of the GDR and the subsequent increased control over 
such sites as Ravensbrück. 
                                                
49 Letter from Frauenkommitee Ravensbrück to Hof a.d. Saale Betreuungsstelle für politisch und religiös 
Verfolgte dated  10/22/49, SAPMO-BArch DY57/1056, unpag. 
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 Thus by the late 1940s, when the first organized commemorations began at 
Ravensbrück, the camp’s narrative was beginning to take form and find expression.50 
Annual ceremonies, usually on the day marking the camp’s liberation, took place at the 
camp’s wall and the mass grave by the crematorium. These events, centered on a 
temporary structure such as an obelisk or an eternal flame, were organized by the 
survivors and involved the VVN and the Demokratischen Frauenbundes Deutschland 
(Democratic Women’s League of Germany). The rallies concentrated on the ideals of 
peace and international understanding between nations. Indeed, these early events were 
marked less by an overt celebration of socialism and partisanship, and focused more on 
honoring the “antifascist” victims. These ceremonies also seized the opportunity to 
impress international delegations, particularly from West Germany. Presenting this 
newer, better Germany that had emerged in the post-Nazi period was a very particular 
concern for the survivors in the Soviet Zone. Emmy Handke for instance, in a conference 
of the Ravensbrück Committee in 1949, stated that recent celebrations had left a 
favorable impression on the “foreign comrades,” who saw that “in the eastern zone and in 
Berlin a new Germany” had arisen.51 In other words, the early forms of commemoration, 
organized in a grass-roots sort of way by survivors living in the Soviet Occupation Zone, 
lacked a direct guidance from the SED but nevertheless sought to legitimize the GDR as 
a new, peaceful Germany and the legacy of those antifascists who had suffered at 
Ravensbrück. 
                                                
50 For a more detailed discussion on the forms and functions of the celebrations before the establishment of 
the Ravensbrück Memorial in 1959, see Insa Eschenbach, “Jahrestage”, 72-74. 
51 MGR/SBG RAI/3-2 I, unpag. 
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 These early commemorations, although organized by ardent communists invested 
in the fledgling GDR, by their very nature fell outside of the control of the regime, a 
development that proved problematic and intolerable from the perspective of the SED. 
Beginning in the 1950s, therefore, Ravensbrück underwent a process of increased 
politicization. For instance, in 1951 the Ravensbrück  Committee proposed placing the 
names of 16 nations on the camp’s wall.52 The countries that had lost citizens at 
Ravensbrück numbered more than 40, but those listed by the mass grave on the “Wall of 
Nations” reflected the foreign policy of the GDR and the Cold War.53 Germany was 
included, thereby raising it into the community of nations who had been the victims of 
the Third Reich, and implicitly rehabilitating the word “Deutschland.” Furthermore, 
whereas before the deceased had often been remembered as “victims of the Nazi regime” 
or “persecuted,” an inscription raised those lying in the mass grave to a new status. 
Henceforth, they had struggled “for the liberation of their home from the fascist yoke.”54 
In other words, the control over the site and its message gradually shifted from the 
survivors to party functionaries, who increasingly formulated the message of 
Ravensbrück to suit the SED’s demands. 
 One primary way in which the regime achieved the streamlining of the political 
messages at Ravensbrück was through a tightened control over organizations such as the 
                                                
52 Surprisingly, the 16 nations included remain unclear. Photographs from the time period, however, 
indicate that the “Wall of Nations” at least included the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, 
Austria, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Yugoslavia, Italy, Romania, and Denmark. 
53 This is made all the more clear when in June of 1959, in conjunction with the preparations for the 
opening of the National Memorial Ravensbrück in September of that year, Erika Buchmann, the acting 
director and former prisoner of Ravensbrück, wrote to the Committee of Antifascist Resistance Fighters. 
She proposed expanding the list to 23 nations, including the United States, and requested a formal reply 
detailing which of the nations could and could not be displayed on the camp wall. MGR/SBG RAI/4-3 II, 
unpag. 
54 Cited in Eschenbach, “Zur Formensprache der Totenehrung,” 19. 
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DFD and the VVN. This allowed for increased influence over the site itself, thereby 
subordinating Ravensbrück to the party. The DFD had been transformed by the regime 
into a “mass organization” of the GDR, bringing it under strict control of the state. The 
SED attempted to channel the efforts of the VVN as well. Initially, the VVN’s publishing 
house had focused on the resistance; beginning in 1951, its tasks were widened to include 
neo-fascism and remilitarization in the West, thereby instrumentalizing and encouraging 
political support for the SED. Moreover, the purges of the 1950s had attempted to 
eliminate rogue elements that refused to represent and instrumentalize a memory of 
fascism as defined by the SED.  
Ultimately, the Central Committee of the SED dissolved the VVN in February of 
1953, under the excuse that the organization had failed to write any meaningful texts on 
the illegal opposition to the Nazi regime or on individual heroes of the resistance.55 The 
Central Committee of the VVN itself announced that it was acknowledging the decision 
of the Politbüro, as the roots of fascism had been destroyed within the GDR anyways, 
and that the building of a socialist society had opened a new chapter in German history.56 
The functions of the VVN were taken over by party and state organs, and the 
organization itself was replaced by the Committee of Antifascist Resistance Fighters 
(KdAW), founded on the same day of the disintegration of its predecessor.  
 This decision in 1953 proved profound for Ravensbrück. Since 1948 the VVN 
had developed plans for memorials at several former concentration camps and sites of 
persecution, including Ravensbrück. The State Commission for Cultural Affairs—a 
                                                
55 For more see Simone Barck, “Zeugnis ablegen. Zum frühen Antifaschismus-Diskurs am Beispiel des 
VVN-Verlages,” in Verwaltete Vergangenheit. Geschichtskultur und Herrschaftslegitimation in der DDR, 
ed. Martin Sabrow (Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsanstalt, 1997), 259-291. 
56 Speech by Fritz Dahlem on February 21, 1953, SAPMO-BArch, DY 57/24/9, unpag. 
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forerunner of the Ministry for Culture—had voiced their support for these 
developments.57 The VVN’s disbandment could very well have been a result of the 
Politbüro’s growing hostility to an organization with ties abroad and an altogether 
independent mindset, as exhibited on the discourse over Jewish restitution. The purges in 
the wake of the Slánský affair concentrated in particular on former board members and 
powerful figures of the VVN, especially those who had supported Jewish claims. This 
hostility toward the organization suggests that the regime refused to tolerate an entity that 
they could not fully control and that threatened to depart from official guidelines. The 
KdAW, often headed by Politbüro members or other powerful apparatchiks, brought the 
survivors and the memorials under closer supervision. In other words, the SED had 
removed unreliable voices and replaced them with individuals who represented the 
antifascism as endorsed by the party.58 It also paved the way for turning the concentration 
camps of the GDR into presentation sites of the politics of this particular brand of 
antifascism. 
 With the creation of the KdAW in 1953, the VVN’s memorial designs fell to the 
regime. The State Commission for Cultural Affairs took over the planning, and was even 
urged by the KdAW to intensify the process by seeking funding for the construction of 
memorials in Buchenwald, Sachsenhausen, and Ravensbrück.59 On November 6, 1954, a 
committee comprised of members of the KdAW, the Museum for German History in 
Berlin, and the State Commission for Cultural Affairs met under the direction of Otto 
                                                
57 Arbeitsprotokoll über die Sitzung des Sekretariats des ZK der SED am 28.4.1950, SAPMO-BArch DY 
30/JIV/2/3A/87, 586. 
58 See Annette Leo, “Antifaschismus und Kalter Krieg,” in Mythos Antifaschismus: Ein Traditionskabinett 
wird kommentiert, ed. Thomas Flierl, et al. (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 1992), 149. 
59 Letter October 10, 1953, SAPMO-Barch DR1/7520, unpag. 
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Grotewohl in order to discuss the design of memorials at these sites and Hohnstein, a 
castle in Saxony in which the SS had erected a concentration camp in 1933. Ravensbrück, 
the committee concluded, should encompass the crematorium, the prison block or 
Zellenbau, and the nearby lake, on which a terrace with a memorial would be erected. 
The site should also feature a museum.60 Less than a month later, the Secretariat of the 
Central Committee of the SED passed a resolution approving of these plans, thus 
bringing them under central control further. The Central Committee tasked the State 
Commission for Cultural Affairs with developing the final plans for the National 
Memorials.61 
 The State Commission for Cultural Affairs, renamed the Ministry for Culture in 
January of 1955, commissioned a group of artists known as the “Buchenwald Collective” 
to draft plans for what was to become the GDR’s Nationale Mahn- und Gedenkstätten, or 
National Memorials. However, the memorial at Ravensbrück carried with it a logistical 
challenge. The Soviet army, which occupied and utilized the former camp, presented a 
significant concern, as it drastically reduced the amount of useable space. Ravensbrück 
was thus the smallest of the East German national memorials. This meant that the camp 
museum and national commemoration rooms of individual countries were confined to the 
former prison building, located behind the four-meter-high camp wall. Besides this 
concession from the Soviet military, the rest of the memorial remained outside of the 
formal camp. This included the mass grave along the “Wall of Nations,” the 
crematorium, and a platform built on the Schwedtsee Lake, the site where the SS 
                                                
60 SAPMO-Barch DR1/7520, unpag. 
61 SAPMO-BArch DY30/JIV/2/3, Nr. 409, 2. For more on the development of the national memorials, see 
Schwarz and Steppan, “Die Entstehung der Nationalen Mahn- und Gedenkstätte Ravensbrück”, 224-233. 
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disposed of the ashes of the cremated. This represented the entirety of the memorial for 
the next 25 years. 
The planners recognized that the museum played a vital role in the formation of 
socialist consciousness. It therefore overtly projected an antifascism as endorsed by the 
SED. Generally, the exhibit portrayed the struggle of the German working class and its 
democratic allies under leadership of the communists against the Nazi regime. The 
historical narrative also exalted the Soviet Union’s role in Europe’s liberation from 
fascism. The visitor likewise encountered the allegation that fascism and militarism 
continued to exist in West Germany, and indeed was on the rise. Only the GDR had 
broken with the past and properly fulfilled the legacy of the antifascists who had opposed 
Hitler. Therefore, the GDR was the true Germany and played an important historical 
role.62 
The ideological content of the memorial thus mirrored the antifascism of the 
regime. This also applied to the opening ceremony, which took on the character of an 
international demonstration. The committee planning the event, under the direction of 
Otto Grotewohl, sought to avoid a “particularly commemorative or somber character.” 
The speakers further emphasized that the legacy of the antifascist resistance remained 
unfulfilled in West Germany, but that in the GDR this had been accomplished upon the 
moment of liberation.63 In other words, the ceremony provided an opportunity to identify 
and disparage the “other” Germany. Looking toward the ten-year anniversary of the 
                                                
62 The 1961 “Statute for the National Memorials” codified these hallmarks and set the guidelines for the 
ideological content of the museums of Buchenwald, Sachsenhausen, and Ravensbrück. For more see Hasko 
Zimmer, Der Buchenwald-Konflikt: zum Streit um Geschichte und Erinnerung im Kontext der deutschen 
Vereinigung (Münster: Agenda, 1999), 76-77. 
63 Cited in Eschenbach, “Jahrestage,” 75-76. 
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GDR, the contrast between the two states took center stage. The inaugural address by 
Rosa Thälmann—a former Ravensbrück prisoner and widow of Ernst Thälmann, the 
former head of the Communist Party of Germany who was murdered in Buchenwald—
exhorted the 70,000 attendees to see “these best patriots” and heroines as role models in 
the East German struggle for peace. The “ruling circles in West Germany, she warned, 
threatened to turn Europe once again into a “center of unrest and war.” The alternative to 
this lay in the “East of Germany, where the legacy of the dead of Ravensbrück and the 
great ideas of the antifascist fight for freedom has become a reality.” Thälmann 
expounded that this made the GDR the “fatherland of all Germans.”64 
With the opening ceremony, Thälmann and the memorial outlined the dominant 
tropes that would form the narrative and shape the political messages of Ravensbrück 
until 1990. A decade of diverse antifascist voices and competing narratives had contested 
the SED’s historical interpretation and complicated the instrumentalization of this 
ideology. Slowly, through purging and streamlining, the regime grasped control of its 
memorials and the discourse over the memory of the Third Reich. 
  
                                                
64 Ibid, 87.  
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Chapter 3 
WHO IS REMEMBERED? CONTOURS OF RAVENSBRÜCK’S 
COMMEMORATION POLITICS 1959-1984 
 
Through party organizations, the SED had fashioned Ravensbrück’s master 
narrative in the 1950s.  The antifascist trope that the regime instrumentalized for its own 
political purposes pervaded the museum and memorial. This antifascism from the top 
down proved problematic, as it created “blind spots” that relegated the suffering of 
individual prisoners or groups of inmates to the margins. Ravensbrück also exhibited this 
development, but the rigid antifascist framework of this memorial took on a unique 
dimension. Because this had been a former women’s camp, the political messages of the 
museum and memorial took on a distinct form. 
 From the very outset, the issue of gender presented a challenge for the planners of 
the memorial. Sculpturally, the typical “socialist realism” as utilized in Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen seemed unfitting for the commemoration of women. At the male camps, 
the sculptures depicted prisoners at the moment of liberation, presented as the long 
awaited triumph over fascism (see Figure 3). This glorification often ignored the stark 
reality of emaciated bodies that the Soviet or American armies encountered, as well as 
the deplorable humanitarian conditions and the continued struggle for life even after the 
arrival of Allied forces. Socialist realism propagated an imaginary and teleological scene 
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in which the antifascist resistors had foiled the Third Reich’s plans, thereby bolstering the 
ruling regime’s legitimacy and claims to the antifascist legacy as a consensus for rule.65  
The sex of Ravensbrück’s prisoners prevented such glorious scenes. For the 
designers, this women’s camp required a different approach. Highly regarded artists such 
as Will Lammert and Fritz Cremer, who also designed the sculptures of the other national 
memorials, envisioned a more delicate image. This highly gendered portrayal of weak 
and emaciated figures implied that women could not partake in the male experience of a 
triumphant liberation, or at least that their experience fundamentally differed from their 
male compatriots. Ironically, the female sculptures more accurately reflect the conditions 
within the camps in the spring of 1945. Nevertheless, they evoke a distinctively poignant 
and emotional tone that contrasts sharply with the masculine images at Sachsenhausen 
and Buchenwald. The latter signify action, dynamism, and the accomplishment of a feat, 
whereas the women of Ravensbrück conjure feelings of sympathy and a quiet, solemn 
pride. In part this reflects the belief that the barbarity of the Third Reich toward women 
and children constituted a greater savagery than that directed towards men.66 Violence 
directed against these prisoners was distinctive and therefore demanded an appropriately 
unique expression. 
                                                
65 For more on socialist realism, see John R. Frey, “Socialist Realism in East Germany,” in The German 
Quarterly 26, no. 4 (Nov., 1953): 272-278; Erwin Pracht, et al., Einführung in den sozialistischen 
Realismus (Berlin: Dietz, 1975); Daphne Berdahl, “Re-Presenting the Socialist Modern: Museums and 
Memory in the Former GDR,” in Socialist Modern: East German Everyday Culture and Politics, ed. 
Katherine Pence et al. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 345-366;  James E. Young, The 
Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); and 
Harold Marcuse, “Holocaust Memorials: The Emergence of a Genre,” in American Historical Review 115 
(Feb., 2010): 53-89. 
66 As a 1981 draft of the design for the new museum makes clear, the “sadism, disregard for humanity, and 
the systematic murder” directed toward women and children and the brutality of fascism was “especially 
expressed” at Ravensbrück. MGR/SBG RAI 3-5 K XXIII, 148. 
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Potentially, the ideology of East German antifascism encompassed all likeminded 
individuals. But given the rhetoric of struggle, fighting, and resisting, the state-
propagated version of antifascism inherently was couched in masculine ideas. Moreover, 
the myth of the “self-liberation,” the exaggerated tale of the prisoners of Buchenwald 
overthrowing the SS guards before the arrival of American forces, provided a much more 
compelling and forceful image that matched the antifascist narrative more conveniently.67 
In other words, fighting and heroic men served the regime and the self-representation of 
the GDR better than the women and events at Ravensbrück. 
             In addition to frailty and suffering, the artists relied on the motif of motherhood 
as resistance. At the entrance of the camp grounds stands a sculpture created by Fritz 
Cremer in 1959 and inaugurated in 1965 on the 20th anniversary of the camp’s liberation. 
The Müttergruppe or group of mothers (Figure 4) commemorates the children and 
women who were imprisoned at Ravensbrück. Cremer also intended, however, to pay 
homage to the care and protection the women offered the young, often at great peril to 
themselves. In postwar histories, this act symbolized the primary way in which the 
female prisoners opposed their SS guards. This gendered form of resistance and its 
representation point to a specifically feminine form of opposition, which again differed 
from the images of male struggle. The mothers, carrying a dead or dying child on a 
stretcher, exhibit deep emotion yet also dignity and hope, reflecting the optimistic dawn 
of a new socialist era. 
                                                
67 The exaggerated representation of the communist uprising at Buchenwald constituted a central aspect to 
the GDR’s mythological rendering of the past. Many of the key political functionaries had in fact been 
imprisoned here. 
For more see Thomas Heimann, Bilder von Buchenwald: die Visualisierung des Antifaschismus in der DDR 
(1945-1990) (Köln: Böhlau, 2005). 
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Another sculpture that picks up on the theme of a distinct female experience is 
Will Lammert’s 1957 design, Die Tragende (Figure 5). This statue was designed as the 
topographical focal point of commemoration ceremonies and the symbol of the 
Ravensbrück memorial.68 The figure stands on an obelisk and overlooks the Schwedtsee 
Lake, where the SS discarded the ashes of the deceased from the nearby crematorium. 
The work projects solemnity, invoking the Christian image of the Pietà and a message of 
triumph over death and thus freedom. It also refers to the solidarity between the women 
within the camp. Originally, Lammert’s design called for a sculpture at the base of the 
obelisk depicting gaunt and shaved women and children (see Figure D). These figurines, 
though unused, would have further invoked the motherhood motif.69  
This gender-specific antifascist message differed from the male version not only 
visually, but in its content and rhetoric as well. The earliest commemorations organized 
in the 1940s addressed specifically a female audience, as seen by the language that 
accompanied these rallies. Photographs from this early period show banners and placards 
with slogans aimed at mothers in particular: “We mothers are raising our children to be 
friends of peace”; “Mother, think of your child—fight for peace!”; “Mothers, secure the 
future of your children”; or “With the mothers of all peoples for peace,” comprised the 
maxims of 1948-1959.70   
                                                
68 For decades, photo albums, postcards, emblems, commemorative pamphlets, books, porcelain, posters, 
coins, and other various items used the iconic image. 
69 Lammert sculpted the 13 other figures for the opening of the memorial but put them into storage when 
they were not used (See Figure 6). In 1985, Lammert’s son designed a memorial in the Grosse Hamburger 
Strasse to Berlin’s Jewish victims who perished in the Holocaust, using his father’s figurines. This 
memorial, incidentally, was the first memorial to Jews in East Berlin. 
70 See Insa Eschenbach, “Geschlechtsspezifische Symbolsierungen im Gedenken. Zur Geschichte der 
Mahn- und Gedenkstätte Ravensbrück,“ in metis 8 (1999): 12-27. 
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An inscription of Anna Seghers, standing at the camp gate, also evokes the virtue 
of motherhood: “They are all our mothers and sisters. You could today neither learn 
freely, nor play, yes perhaps you would not even have been born, had such women not 
placed their soft, slight bodies like iron shield between you and your future during the 
entire time of fascist terror.” These words evoke a female heroism and fabricate a reality 
of camp life that exalts the women of Ravensbrück. The natural desire to honor these 
individuals took the form of an idealization of women that romanticized their suffering 
and proposed an ideal type of female behavior. The prisoners were elevated into the 
position of role models, to whom the successor generations were indebted in a very 
specific way. 
Overall, Ravensbrück’s messages created evocative images that captured the 
audience’s imagination in a distinctive manner, concentrating on the feminine form of the 
prisoners’ resistance. But like their masculine counterparts, these female figures served as 
orientation points for GDR society. The SED explicitly called upon the viewer to emulate 
the heroic prisoners’ political convictions and honor their sacrifice by creating a socialist 
Germany. The women of Ravensbrück could inspire all, but these heroines provided a 
political and moral compass particularly for East German women. Nevertheless, the 
memorial’s antifascist narrative did not always find a receptive audience. Particularly 
former prisoners of Ravensbrück contested the regime’s vision.  
Some survivors who bought into the antifascist narrative rejected the aesthetic 
choices of the artists because they did not sufficiently illustrate the resistance of the 
political prisoners. For instance, members of the Ravensbrück Committee wrote Otto 
Grotewohl in November 1957 to complain that Die Tragende “exclusively expressed the 
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idea of solidarity, but not the struggle that the women engaged in within the camp.” In 
other words, they rejected the gender-based differences among the sculptures of the 
national memorials. The Committee demanded that the museum rectify this issue, where 
opposition should come to the forefront.71 
Other survivors felt alienated by the discussion of resistance and opposition. Even 
within the highly political Ravensbrück Committee, critical voices questioned the official 
history. Protocols reveal that some former prisoners took issue with what they 
characterized as exaggerated accounts of the resistance in Ravensbrück. They refuted, for 
instance, that the communist organization had prevented executions carried out by the 
SS; only in a few individual instances had this been possible. Moreover, these critics 
denied the existence of an “organization” as such in the camp. In reality, a loose yet 
understood cooperation dictated daily life in Ravensbrück.72 In addition, many women 
denied that they had offered resistance; commonly, survivors claimed that the men had 
struggled, while the women had merely relied on solidarity and the prisoner 
community.73  
Some critics, however, went further in their deviation from the memorial’s 
narrative, describing an existence that starkly contradicted tales of heroism and solidarity. 
Margarete Buber-Neumann, for instance, dismissed the notion that suffering could 
                                                
71 MGR/SBG RAI/4-3 XI, unpag. For more on the sculptures of Ravensbrück, see Kathrin Hoffman-
Curtius, “Caritas und Kampf: Die Mahnmale in Ravensbrück,” in Die Sprache des Gedenkens, 55-68. 
72 SAPMO-BArch DR1/7525, 102-103 
73 Atina Grossmann encountered this gender-specific antifascist rhetoric as late as 1978. Visiting with 
survivors at Ravensbrück, she was struck by their own assessment that they had not been like the men of 
Buchenwald. Moreover, she found remarkably little discussion of the struggle as portrayed in the museum. 
Instead, most of the former inmates recalled the secretly organized 1944 Christmas celebration as the major 
act of solidarity in the camp. For more see Atina Grossmann, “Zwei Erfahrungen im Kontext des Themas 
‘Gender und Holocaust,’” in Forschungsschwerpunkt Ravensbrück, ed. Jacobeit (Berlin: Edition Hentrich, 
1997), 136-146. 
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somehow beatify individuals. Life in the concentration camp had proven the exact 
opposite. Moreover, she affirmed that the conditions of the camp and the utter loss of 
dignity made any resistance impossible. “Full of envy and resentment one looked upon 
the other,” and fights broke out over just a little more nourishment.74 Hildegard Hansche 
spoke of the “law of the wolf” which dictated daily routines; prisoners did anything 
possible, even at the expense of fellow inmates, in order to survive.75 Committed 
communists and members of the celebrated and fabled antifascist resistance did not fully 
endorse the narrative, and stated this quite openly.  
Beyond the ideological content, some women expressed discontent over the 
management of the site. Despite notions of parity with their male colleagues, a definite 
“separate but equal” tone permeated Ravensbrück. Portraits of leading statesmen, and not 
women, as the symbol of all antifascists greeted visitors in the entrance hall of the 
museum.76 The memorial received less funding, ostensibly because of the smaller 
dimensions of the site in comparison to the male camps. This limited financial support 
meant that research and pedagogical activities were not as developed as in Buchenwald 
or Sachsenhausen.77 Female staffers and historians continually felt that Ravensbrück 
received secondary attention from the state and the general public because it was a 
                                                
74 Margarete Buber-Neumann, Als Gefangene bei Stalin und Hitler. Eine Welt im Dunkel (Stuttgart: 
Seewald, 1985), 243. 
75 Anne-Katrin Ebert, Dr. Hildegard Hansche (1896-1992). Stiftungsvermächtnis einer Ravensbrückerin 
(Schriftenreihe der Dr. Hildegard Hansche Stiftung Vol. 1, Fürstenberg, 1996), 60. 
76 These were to remain in place until 1990. Sigrid Jacobeit, interview by author, Berlin, Germany, July 3, 
2012. 
77 Not until 1975 was a “Pedagogical Department” instituted at Ravensbrück, followed by a dedicated 
“Research Department” in 1981. The site thus struggled to attract and retain trained professional historians. 
Because of its diminished stature, Ravensbrück was seen as a “back-water” and not a desirable place to 
work. Sigrid Jacobeit, interview by author, Berlin, Germany, July 3, 2012. 
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women’s camp.78 The fact that no major political functionary from the Central 
Committee of the SED ever spoke at any of the ceremonies was seen by many of the 
former prisoners and female staff as a sign that the memorial’s importance ranked behind 
that of the other national memorials. When middling representatives did attend and gave 
a speech, it was always a man, a fact that irritated many of the women in attendance.79  
Male functionaries predominantly directed and influenced the site, causing 
dissatisfaction among survivors. As early as January 1959, members of the Ravensbrück 
Committee voiced their opposition to the regime’s interference in appointing a director 
for the memorial. The Committee wanted someone from within their own ranks, stating 
that “when filling the position of director in Ravensbrück, women who were there should 
be given preference.”80 Ultimately, the SED backed the “outsider” Hildegard Guddorf of 
the VVN as the replacement for the acting director Erika Buchmann.81 
Despite the criticisms from survivors regarding the museum’s content and the 
management of the memorial, the regime insisted on creating Ravensbrück in its specific 
image. The site therefore upheld a glorified yet gendered narrative of resistance that 
vaguely and problematically incorporated women. The exhibit ambiguously celebrated 
the thousands who “participated in the production and distribution of materials against 
                                                
78 This can be measured by the fact that only two publications on Ravensbrück appeared in multiple 
editions. See Charlotte Müller, Die Klempnerkolonne in Ravensbrück, Erinnerungen des Häftlings Nr. 
10787 (Frankfurt a.M.: Röderberg-Verlag, 1981) and Erika Buchmann, Die Frauen von Ravensbrück 
(Berlin: Kongreβ Verlag, 1959). 
79 Sigrid Jacobeit, for instance, reported that her first trip to Ravensbrück was in conjunction with the 40th 
anniversary of the camp’s liberation. At this rally, Ministry for Culture Kurt Hager addressed the crowd. 
She felt that it was an outrage that a man, and not a woman, would give the opening address at a women’s 
concentration camp. Sigrid Jacobeit, Interview by author. Berlin, Germany, July 3, 2012. 
80 SAPMO-BArch DR1/7525, 101. 
81 The documentary evidence does not illuminate the background to this decision or the reaction. 
Buchmann was a Ravensbrück survivor, while Guddorf had spent the war in exile in Moscow, and was 
therefore presumably closely tied to the party. 
 
 
39 
 
Hitler and the war.”82 These individuals “stood in the ranks of those who saved the honor 
of the German working class and the nation,” and were “equal partners of their male class 
comrades on all fronts of the class struggle.”83 The women of Ravensbrück, in other 
words, equally experienced suffering and shared in the glory of their male comrades. 
But despite this assertion, the generic mantle of “resistance” said little about the 
actual experiences of the vast majority of the prisoners. Any concrete examples that 
illustrated opposition inherently emphasized “feminine” traits. For instance, women 
practiced resistance when they “supported the families of those imprisoned and much 
more.”84 “More” encompassed motherly functions such as “adopting motherless children, 
obtaining clothing and nourishment, playing with children, and organizing celebrations 
for them.” Political education constituted an important part of female resistance, thereby 
laying the groundwork for the future after the Third Reich.85 In other words, the 
discussions over what type of resistance these women were organizing revolved around 
their ability to fulfill motherly roles and carry out gender-specific behavior, such as 
providing a source of comfort, support, or solidarity. As the memorial made clear, “the 
mother-child problem played a dominant role for these prisoners.”86 
                                                
82 SAPMO-BArch DR1/7526, 118. 
83 MGR/SBG RAI 3-5 K XXVIII, 144. This emphasis on equality, a report from the Ravensbrück memorial 
noted in 1985, was often positively interpreted by West German visitors, who “on their own point out that 
for example the demands of working women—already raised by the KPD in the Weimar Republic—today 
have still not yet been realized in their own country.” MGR/SBG RAI/3-5 K XXVII, 145. 
84 SAPMO-BArch DR1/7526, 118. 
85 MGR/SBG RAI 3-5 K XXVIII, 182. 
86 SAPMO-BArch DR1/7178, 88. This trope remained constant for most of the memorial’s existence. 
Maternalism, Grossmann found, lay at the core of any discussion over prisoner social bonds even in the late 
1970s. Moreover, she concluded, these memories complimented the GDR’s exhaltation of motherhood as 
the guarantee of freedom and progress. Atina Grossmann, “Zwei Erfahrungen,” 139. 
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The gendered division of labor within the resistance itself partly explains the 
differing accounts of communist resistance between men and women. Generally, males 
carried out the more “traditional” actions associated with active resistance, while women 
filled other roles such as harboring fugitives, distributing leaflets, acting as couriers, or 
simply offering emotional support to their male comrades. That these acts were 
considered part of opposition yet still not on the same level as what men had 
accomplished under the Nazi dictatorship finds reflection in the fact that the GDR 
recognized men disproportionately as Kämpfer or “fighters.”87 In other words, women 
had been “separate but equal” members of the communist struggle.  
In either case, the embellished and problematic account of the political women of 
the camp excluded a great majority of women in the commemoration at Ravensbrück. For 
instance, the hostility toward the “criminal” and “asocial” prisoners led to their 
marginalization. The portrayal of the political prisoners as mythic and superhuman 
figures allowed no room for those with questionable backgrounds who threatened to 
undermine the moral ascendancy and legitimacy of communist party members. The 
regime showed an extreme reluctance to commemorate criminals, prostitutes, 
malingerers, alcoholics, and any number of women imprisoned for their inability or 
refusal to conform to the social norms that remained partly in effect even in the GDR; the 
Third Reich and East Germany shared some of the same aversions toward “undesirable” 
social groups. 
                                                
87 In 1986, an overview over the number of “recognized fighters against fascism and persecuted of the Nazi 
regime and their dependents” demonstrates this trend. Of 12,219 persecuted total, 5,306 were men and 
6,912 were women. Within this total, the GDR recognized 3,312 men as “fighters,” but only 931 women. In 
other words, women fell into the passive category of “persecuted” and outnumbered men here nearly 2:1. 
SAPMO-BArch DY57/946, unpag. 
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This is especially true for one distinctive category of prisoners at Ravensbrück.  
Women imprisoned for prostitution and those victims forced into the “camp bordellos” of 
male camps remained an absolute taboo.88 Social stigma in part explains this; many 
women who suffered rape at the hands of occupation soldiers refused to report the crime 
out of shame. Similarly, upon liberation many may have remained silent.  
But politics also played a role. Just as rape by Soviet soldiers went unmentioned 
because of political reasons, this chapter of concentration camp history proved a political 
liability. The SS built the “bordellos” to promote compliance among male prisoners, who 
were occasionally “rewarded” with a trip to these special barracks. This incentive 
particularly privileged high-ranking inmates such as Kapos or barrack elders. Senior 
prisoners who had been among the first imprisoned by the Nazi regime generally held 
these functionary positions. As such, many were political prisoners. The SED refused to 
acknowledge this reality that implicated the “antifascist resistance heroes,” particularly 
since many party functionaries had themselves experienced imprisonment in 
concentration camps.89 Female survivors, as well, relativized the aspect of forced 
prostitution, often concluding that most of the women who were forced into the 
“bordellos” had been prostitutes anyway. The suffering of sexual violence by as many as 
                                                
88 This, incidentally, was also a little discussed topic in West Germany. 
89 The privileged role of Funktionshäftlinge or “prisoner functionaries” in general was a difficult topic in 
the GDR. Certainly, such a position could facilitate opportunities for survival and were key to the success 
of an organization within the camp. However, it also could mean the abuse of power and inherently 
demanded cooperation with the SS. This “gray zone” meant that in order to succeed in their own survival or 
in protection of their group, Funktionshäftlinge many times needed to resort to brutal or discriminatory 
behavior to other prisoner groups. 
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35,000 women, most of whom were “recruited” in Ravensbrück, went unmentioned until 
well into the 1990s.90 
The blind spots of the memorial toward non-communist political prisoners further 
illustrate the hallmarks of the antifascism enshrined at Ravensbrück. While inmates 
belonging to the SPD were marginally recognized, the suffering of those deemed to have 
been members of “bourgeois” resistance went largely unnoticed. This included those 
arrested in the wake of the July 20 attempt on Hitler’s life or members of the “Solf 
Circle.” The museum gave no indication that the SS had incarcerated members of these 
conspiracies in the camp’s prison building as “special prisoners” while awaiting trial. 
Thus individuals such as Hanna Solf, Elisabeth von Thadden, Julius Leber, Adolf 
Reichwein, Ulrich von Hassell, Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, Peter Yorck von 
Wartenburg, Helmuth James Graf von Moltke, and Nina Schenk Gräfin von Stauffenberg 
remained unknown to visitors of the site.  
Commemorating individuals with staunchly bourgeois, aristocratic, militarist, and 
nationalist-conservative backgrounds proved incompatible with an antifascism that 
regularly decried these traits. Moreover, non-leftist resistance presented a tremendous 
challenge to the GDR’s heroic and glorified portrayal of the struggle against fascism; 
acknowledging that the most successful attempt on Hitler’s life had emanated from 
somewhere other than the working class undermined the monopoly over resistance that 
antifascism claimed, thus undermining the GDR’s legitimacy. Lastly, West Germany’s 
                                                
90 For more on forced prostitution in the concentration camps, see Christa Paul, Zwangsprostitution: 
staatlich errichtete Bordelle im Nationalsozialismus (Berlin: Hentrich, 1994); and Baris Alakus, Katharina 
Kniefacz, and Robert Vorber, eds., Sex-Zwangsarbeit in nationalsozialistischen Konzentrationslagern 
(Wien: Mandelbaum, 2006).   
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celebration of many of these conspirators added yet another dimension that explained the 
silence.91 
Indeed, political reasons often prevented many women’s stories from finding a 
broad audience, as they challenged or contradicted official policy in the GDR. This 
affected Jehovah’s Witnesses in particular. About 10,000 Jehovah’s Witnesses were 
imprisoned in the Third Reich because their religious convictions brought them into 
conflict with the regime. Behavior such as refusing to swear oaths or give the “Hitler 
greeting,” as well as refusing military service, led to the persecution of this group. 
Although after 1945 the authorities recognized Witnesses as “Victims of Fascism,” the 
political neutrality and lack of support for communism was regarded as hostile to the 
state.92 This had the result that this religious group went entirely without mention in 
Ravensbrück until after the fall of the GDR. 
Perhaps the most intriguing silence at the memorial, however, concerned the 
camp’s racial victims, particularly Jews. That this presented a problematic topic of 
discussion should hardly surprise, given the divisive rhetoric toward competing victim 
group in the early 1950s. How the memorial accomplished this, however, illuminates the 
idiosyncrasy and selectivity of the East German antifascist narrative.  This is illustrated 
by a 1960 set of instructions to tour guides at Ravensbrück, providing tips and 
                                                
91 Andreas Dorpalen argues that West Germany’s eventual fixation on the July 20 conspirators and 
dismissal of the communist resistance encouraged East German historians to inversely focus on the 
communist resistance and ignore bourgeois opposition. See Andreas Dorpalen, German History in Marxist 
Perspective: The East German Approach (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1985), 419. 
92 Jehovah’s Witnesses faced continued persecution in the GDR and were closely monitored by the Stasi, 
until finally obtaining legal recognition in March of 1990. For more, see Gerhard Besier and Clemens 
Vollnhals, eds., Repression und Selbstbehauptung: Die Zeugen Jehovas unter der NS- und der SED-
Diktatur (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2003). 
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suggestions on how to increase the effectiveness of the experience.93 In this rendition, 
communists planned “resistance” (underlined in document) against the SS and “foiled” 
their measures, orchestrated sabotage, and fought for the lives of their comrades. The 
peculiarity of the document, however, stems from the instructions to explicitly describe 
Nazi barbarity and murder. Paradoxically, the detailed references to Nazi genocide 
entirely failed to mention Jews.94  
Visitors consequently learned how the SS “exterminated tens of thousands of 
Ravensbrück women and children,” and that the SS murdered 42,000 individuals in the 
camp’s gas chamber.95 Tour guides were encouraged to discuss the killing process in 
Ravensbrück and in Bernburg through Operation 14f13, as well as the deportations to 
Auschwitz, Chełmo, and Majdanek. Yet the instructions completely omitted that the SS 
murdered predominantly Jews at these facilities. Again, when Auschwitz-Birkenau 
closed and the SS transferred the killing process to Ravensbrück, the racial policies of the 
Nazis failed to come up. Thus, the museum accomplished a portrayal of the Holocaust 
without Jews. Moreover, the antifascist narrative had appropriated aspects of the 
genocide and experience in the extermination camps for itself. In other words, the 
museum seized upon Nazi barbarism by suggesting that it had been directed against 
“antifascist resistors,” without qualifying against who this violence was actually aimed.  
                                                
93 SAPMO-BArch DR1/7525, 113-124. The document does not provide an author’s name or an originating 
office, but written in pencil at the top of the report is the name of Miethe. Based on other documents, I have 
been able to ascertain that she worked in the Ministry for Culture and frequently was involved in matters 
concerning Ravensbrück.   
94 SAPMO-BArch DR1/7525 115, 122. 
95 SAPMO-BArch DR1/7525, 115-116. As pointed out earlier, it is estimated that less than 30,000 women 
died in Ravensbrück. Where this figure of 42,000 comes from is unclear. 
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The 1959 Ravensbrück memorial thus further demonstrates the unspoken but 
implied characteristics of the SED’s “objective” antifascism. First of all, antifascism 
belonged exclusively to the left, particularly the communist movement. They 
monopolized victimhood and claims to moral legitimacy which suffering under the Third 
Reich had ostensibly brought. In addition, antifascism was temporal in the sense that it 
could include or reject incompatible elements based on the GDR’s policies and politics at 
the time. Lastly, the decreed antifascism as enshrined in the national memorials was 
morally impeccable and beyond reproach. Any challenges to this notion were completely 
expunged from the historical narrative.   
These contours of the Ravensbrück memorial, shaped largely by the SED’s 
policies, characterized the site from 1959 onward. When the Soviet military vacated the 
camp’s administrative building in 1977, the increased exhibit space prompted a 
renovation of the old museum. Confined to the lower level of the prison building, the 
Ministry for Culture with approval of the SED made plans to relocate the museum and 
redesign the content of the exhibit.96 The regime entrusted this process to a committee 
composed of Ravensbrück staff, historians of Berlin University, KdAW representatives, 
and a handful of other party functionaries.  
Despite ambitions for an updated museum, the planners ultimately replicated the 
hallmarks of the old exhibit. The familiar focus on the communist resistance, the role of 
women in this opposition, socialist solidarity, and the role of the Soviet Union in “freeing 
the peoples from fascism” defined the proposal.97 Once again critical voices raised their 
                                                
96 The upper level of the prison block, containing the individual national commemoration rooms, remained 
in place and were not included in the relocation. 
97 SAPMO-BArch DR1/7179, 246. 
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concerns and in particular questioned the continued marginalization of other prisoner 
groups.  
For instance, in October 1981 the KdAW reviewed the committee’s proposed 
script and drafted a response that lambasted the lack of differentiation. The KdAW felt 
that the authors of the script had “approached the design from an incorrect point of 
departure” by focusing on the history of the Communist Party of Germany. The current 
design, the KdAW admonished, could not be approved without substantial revisions. The 
report emphasized that the history of a women’s concentration camp needed to remain 
the central point. While this nevertheless should be framed by the exposure of fascist 
criminality and the antifascist resistance led by communists, the “struggle” of social 
democrats, Christians, and “other antifascists” needed to be included. The KdAW 
therefore recommended that the new museum include an area where “all victims could be 
honored, including Jews, and gypsies.”98 
This rejection from the standard bearer of antifascism went unheeded, but did not 
entirely disappear. On March 11, 1983, multiple experts and party functionaries met in 
order to present the final draft of the museum to the representatives of the local and 
regional SED offices, as well as members of the Ministry for Culture and the KdAW. 
One of the lead authors of the renovation, Dr. Laurenz Demps of the Berlin University, 
began the meeting by bemoaning the difficulty that Ravensbrück presented, as the camp 
had not been freed through a revolt of the prisoners like at Buchenwald, thereby limiting 
                                                
98 MGR/SBG RAI/3-5 K XXIII, 169. This idea had already been outlined in a conversation between Klaus 
Martin of the KdAW and Deputy Minister for Culture Siegfried Wagner in March of 1981. Wagner had at 
that time voiced his support for a greater commemoration of racial victims, agreeing with Martin that 
continued negative refusals to do so would lead to “unforeseen foreign relation problems.” MGR/SBG 
RAI/3-5 K XXXXIV, 70.  
 
 
47 
 
the source material.99 Because the episode of liberation was integral to the presentation of 
the camp’s history, Demps suggested bringing the Soviet liberation to the forefront. In 
addition, he added, the detailed treatment of “every political fact” surrounding 
Ravensbrück’s history could only succeed by bringing in materials from the other 
concentration camps in order to fully illustrate the nature of fascism and the antifascist 
resistance.100 In other words, the liberation of Ravensbrück’s women lacked the drama of 
Buchenwald, which provided a more compelling historical drama. Furthermore, this 
women’s camp lacked the source material to support the antifascist account, thereby 
requiring the introduction of the male camps in order to buttress the narrative. 
The KdAW’s criticism reemerged, this time from party functionaries. Dr. Berger 
of the Potsdam District Council intervened, saying that it was important to impart to 
youths who visited Ravensbrück that not just “well-known resistance fighters” were 
incarcerated here, but ordinary women who may have simply given bread to a POW. He 
made the case that the Nazi persecution of ordinary people should be emphasized, as well 
as the social support amongst the prisoners.101 He was supported in his statements by Dr. 
Krabiel, the First Secretary of the SED District Office Gransee. He rhetorically asked 
“against whom the fascist brutality aimed anyways.” He conceded that it targeted “first 
and foremost” politicals, but that the SS directed this also against “Jews, Gypsies, the 
religious, so-called sub-humans like Poles and Ukrainians.” Furthermore, Krabiel 
                                                
99 The exaggerated representation of the communist uprising at Buchenwald constituted a central aspect to 
the GDR’s mythological rendering of the past. Many of the key political functionaries had in fact been 
imprisoned here. 
100 MGR/SBG RAI/3-5 K XXVIII, 32. 
101 MGR/SBG RAI/3-5 K XXVIII, 32. 
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emphasized, Nazi barbarity was also directed against German women who committed 
Rassenschande102 and “criminals.”103  
Dr. Demps dismissed these interjections by pointing out the difficulty of delving 
into such subjects in great detail. It would be too “complicated” to portray “the complex 
fates of 132,000 individuals in such a manner that every remaining former prisoner could 
have the opportunity to recognize themselves.” He rejected the calls for greater focus on 
the daily life of the prisoners, as the “social aspect was the preservation of life against the 
destructive mechanisms.” In other words, the resistance within the camp constituted the 
dominant experience of the camp. The current design, therefore, sufficiently represented 
the “typical fates of those who do not carry famous names.”104 The meeting ended with 
the words of Siegfried Wagner, the representative of the Ministry for Culture, who 
ignored the statements and instead endorsed the design, praising the work of everyone 
who had contributed. Of the 15 meeting attendees, four had been women and none had 
taken a position on this matter, including Dr. Gerda Haak, the memorial director. 
When the “Museum of Antifascist Resistance” opened its doors in the renovated 
Kommandantur, the internal admonishments and suggestions had made no impact. 
Clearly, disinterest in far-reaching investigations of female experience in the communist 
resistance or in Ravensbrück ruled the day. The new museum generally followed the 
same narrative as its predecessor, using the increased floor space to display more artifacts 
                                                
102 Literally, “race disgrace.” Engaging in sexual relations with members of “undesirable” or “inferior” 
races qualified as a crime of this category. 
103 MGR/SBG RAI/3-5 K XXVIII, 32-33. 
104 MGR/SBG RAI/3-5 K XXVIII, 33. 
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such as uniforms or prisoner possessions. Furthermore, the 1984 exhibit continued the 
familiar relativized depiction of the Holocaust, relegating the topic to the periphery. 
For instance, the museum referenced “over 17 million deportations to 
extermination camps Auschwitz, Belzec, Maidanek [sic], etc.” without further 
comment.105 In breaking down prisoner demographics within Ravensbrück in 1939, the 
nondescript figure of 36 women incarcerated because of “violation of the Nurnberg 
Laws” failed to elucidate the anti-Semitic body of legislation aimed at removing Jews 
from public life.106 Although the exhibit explained that in 1944, Jews constituted 15.1% 
of the population and “Gypsies” a further 5.4%, it did not mention either group when 
discussing transports from the camp to extermination facilities.107 These camps served the 
ambiguous purpose of “isolating, decimating, and physically destroying the opponents of 
German imperialism,” namely the “working class and its Marxist-Leninist party.” 
Although “individuals from various backgrounds, who because of their worldview, their 
beliefs, or their national heritage were unwilling to bow to the fascist mechanism of 
destruction,” this group remained an ambiguous coalition under direction of the 
communist resistance.108 In other words, East German memory culture continued to 
appropriate genocide as barbarity directed against political prisoners without explicitly 
including racial victims under the mantle of the antifascist resistance. 
                                                
105 MGR/SBG RAI/3-5 K XXVIII, 143. 
106 MGR/SBG RAI/3-5 K XXVIII, 161. 
107 MGR/SBG RAI/3-5 K XXVIII, 161-2. 
108 MGR/SBG RAI/3-5 K XXVIII, 164. 
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Despite the growing criticisms, a differentiated exploration of daily camp life and 
an unpacking of the regime’s monolithic category of “antifascist resistor” would not only 
need to fall to individual historians interested in such a task. It would also have to wait. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DIFFERENTIATING THE ANTIFASCIST NARRATIVE: 
CURRENTS OF LIBERALIZATION IN THE 1980S 
 
On September 20, 1984, the director of the Ravensbrück memorial authored a 
proposal outlining a planned collection of documents chronicling the history of the camp. 
The book aimed at contributing to the “political-ideological education” of especially the 
youth by inculcating notions of “freedom and the struggle for a happy socialist 
society.”109 The concrete research proposals implied that increased focus on different 
prison groups—such as the “religiously persecuted” and “special prisoners,” incarcerated 
in Ravensbrück in the wake of the failed attempt on Hitler’s life on July 20, 1944—would 
lead to a differentiation of the narrative that would fulfill the project’s ambitions.110 In 
other words, including more voices in the antifascist narrative would benefit it and have 
positive influences on public memory and socialist consciousness. 
This document illustrates the emerging desires for a more nuanced narrative, as 
expressed in the critiques of the museum redesign in the years before. These calls, 
ultimately, had gone unheard and failed to have a meaningful influence on the museum 
by the time it opened in 1984. During the 1980s, however, a new political climate 
developed in which critical discourse not only emerged, but also exerted marginal 
influence.  
                                                
109 SAPMO-BArch DR1/7178, 156. 
110 SAPMO-BArch DR1/7178, 157. 
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 In the case of Ravensbrück, this new atmosphere seems to have started around 
1981 following a letter from Vinzenz Rose, president of the Association of Sinti and 
Roma in West Germany. Rose wrote the KdAW petitioning the placement of a plaque 
honoring the Sinti and Roma of Ravensbrück. The KdAW deliberated and denied the 
request on the grounds that the “memorials in the GDR had been built based on a 
particular design” that precluded any additions. The KdAW added that despite this 
decision, the GDR “eternally holds the incarcerated, martyred, and murdered in high 
regard.” Rose issued a snide response in which he bequeathed a “bravo” to the chairman 
of the organization and offered the thanks of his community for the GDR’s disposition 
toward the ethnic group. Rose furthermore questioned the justification for the decision, as 
the Union had successfully petitioned the Auschwitz memorial to fashion a plaque for the 
Sinti and Roma, despite the site’s strict historic preservation guidelines.111 Rose ended 
the letter with the request for at least a small marker honoring his mother, who had 
perished at Ravensbrück.112 
This letter had a curiously strong effect. The Secretary of the KdAW discussed 
the petition with the deputy Minister for Culture, imparting his disappointment over the 
outcome of Rose’s first request. The deputy minister agreed with the assessment that 
further refusals could lead to “unforeseen foreign policy problems.”113 The Secretary 
                                                
111 In fact, this memorial in Auschwitz—from where Vinzenz and his brother had escaped—was privately 
financed by Vinzenz. It was inaugurated in 1974. 
112 MGR/SBG RAI/3-5 XXXXIV, 69. 
113 This concern seemed especially pronounced for the GDR, given Vinzenz Rose’s influence in West 
Germany. Vinzenz along with his brother Oskar founded the Verband rassisch verfolgter nicthjüdischen 
Glaubens (Association of Racially Persecuted Non-Jews) in response to the FRG’s refusal to recognize the 
genocide of the Sinti and Roma. From this the Association of Sinti and Roma emerged. His engagement 
earned him the German Federal Cross of Merit in 1978, and in 1982 this organization’s advocacy resulted 
in recognition of the genocide by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. Moreover, as a chairman of the International 
Romani Union, Rose represented a potential source of international criticism directed at the GDR. 
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introduced the KdAW’s idea of a specially designed room in the prison building in which 
racial victims could be honored. The deputy minister approved of the plan, stating that in 
the course of the renovation this would not be altogether difficult. He furthermore added 
that the placement of a plaque for Rose’s mother should be considered, and that the 
KdAW should direct him to the Ministry for Culture.114  
Ultimately, this second petition also received a negative answer.115 Despite this, 
Rose’s letter left an impact at Ravensbrück. The episode had prompted the KdAW to 
formulate a plan that would adequately honor the marginalized racial victims. Though it 
did not turn into a reality in the 1984 museum, this proposal remained a long-term 
project. In this they found support from the Ministry for Culture, which administered the 
memorial. Moreover, both organizations had become more aware and sensitive to 
concerns from abroad. A series of events at Ravensbrück reveal the lasting influence that 
Vinzenz Rose had left. 
To begin with, Ravensbrück developed a sensitivity toward the various victim 
groups within the camp. On September 11, 1985, the director of the memorial wrote the 
Ministry for Culture that Ravensbrück’s staff increasingly used the term “Sinti and 
Roma” rather than “gypsies” (Zigeuner) in their work. This conformed to the 
“international standards” of referring to ethnic groups by the name they liked to call 
themselves, the letter explained. Moreover, the term “gypsy” was a pejorative used by the 
Nazis and therefore was inappropriate for further use. The director closed the letter by 
stating that the staff had reviewed the museum exhibits to see where changes needed to 
                                                
114 MGR/SBG RAI/3-5 LXIII, 49. 
115 The reasons for this are unclear. 
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be made, and that in general it had become imperative to be aware of any other ethnic 
groups among the prisoner population.116 The ministry responded positively approving 
this measure, stating that the Culture Department of the Central Committee of the SED 
had ordered the term “gypsy” no longer be used in the national memorials.117 
Less than a month later another letter from the director to the Ministry for Culture 
requested approval for a memorial plaque to the Jewish and Sinti and Roma who perished 
at Ravensbrück. This plan resembled Rose’s 1981 request, and likely drew inspiration 
from it; the director explained that this initiative had originated in discussions with the 
Secretary of the KdAW. He proposed the plaque to read: “In honor of the countless 
Jewish and other victims of fascist racial fanaticism [faschistischen Rassenwahn].” The 
letter closed by saying that this would allow visitors to honor Jewish and Sinti and Roma 
victims, and all those persecuted specifically because of their race.118  
This new interest in the overlooked victims of Ravensbrück did not confine itself 
to the triad of the memorial, the KdAW, and the Ministry for Culture. Concurrently, 
similar realizations for a much-needed differentiation of the memorial’s antifascist 
narrative emerged. For instance, in July of 1985, Werner Händler, a concentration camp 
survivor, party member, and head of the Sachsenhausen Survivor Committee, drafted a 
plain-spoken letter to Hermann Axen, a member of the Politbüro. Händler had been asked 
by Axen to put into writing his experiences following a four week goodwill trip to the 
United States on behalf of the Liga für Völkerfreundschaft (League for Friendship 
Between Peoples). Between participating in 40th anniversary ceremonies marking the end 
                                                
116 BArch DR1/7178, 249. 
117 BArch DR1/7178, 251. 
118 BArch DR1/7178, 250. 
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of WWII and meeting American politicians such as Senator Joe Biden and Jesse Jackson, 
Händler had met with several Jewish journalists and attended a number of symposia. In 
the last decade, Händler noted, a broad identification with Judaism had developed in the 
United States in reaction to the Nazi genocide and “the influence of the State of Israel.” 
Händler reported that many non-religious individuals now felt strongly bound to Judaism. 
Furthermore, he went on, “this concerns a not yet concluded, strongly emotional process 
which should be taken into consideration, especially in our cooperation with the USA and 
with Americans.”119 In other words, Werner Händler had experienced the increased role 
that the Holocaust played in American consciousness. This phenomenon also explained 
why the “visit of memorials in former concentration camps becomes evaluated from the 
standpoint of whether the Jewish victims are commemorated in an appropriate form.”120 
It was the widely-held opinion, Händler implied, that the GDR inadequately 
commemorated the plight of racial victims. 
Turning to his influential friend Hermann Axen, Händler had brought his 
concerns to the attention of a prominent politician. As a Politbüro member, Axen wielded 
considerable influence and power. Moreover, as a chair member of the Committee for 
Antifascist Resistance Fighters, the GDR’s memorials and memory culture fell within his 
competency. Thus Händler could be assured of being heard and taken seriously. As head 
of the Sachsenhausen Survivor Committee, he was a functionary and could speak to the 
subject of memorialization within the GDR. Equally, the fact that he had been allowed to 
travel abroad indicated that the regime trusted him implicitly and valued his observations. 
                                                
119 MGR/SBG RAI/3-5 K VI, 100. 
120 MGR/SBG RAI/3-5 K VI, 100. 
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Moreover, a Jewish survivor of Auschwitz and Buchenwald, Axen may have been 
intrinsically sympathetic to Händler’s concerns.121  
Perhaps just in order to be sure of pressing his concerns home to Axen and other 
high-ranking SED luminaries to whom the letter may be circulated, Händler adopted a 
very pragmatic argument for why this mattered. He invoked specific incidents that 
occurred during the early 1980s, which Americans travelling to Ravensbrück had issued 
sharp criticisms of the memorial. In particular they had decried the lack of recognition of 
Jewish victims.122 Nevertheless, Händler wrote, nothing had been done about this. In 
order to push the issue, Händler ended on an ominous note: if again nothing would be 
done, the GDR would “expose ourselves potentially to further attacks from the USA 
media.”123  
The discourse taking place among these functionaries and bureaucrats reflected 
the changing atmosphere brought on by Ostpolitik. The normalization of relations 
between East and West Germany led to hitherto increased cultural exchange. The greater 
contact with Western intellectuals and access to literature from capitalist countries 
became easier. In addition, creeping reforms opened new possibilities for historians, 
                                                
121 This was not the first time that Werner Händler had travelled outside of the GDR. In the online index of 
the German Federal Archive, in the Protocols of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Socialist 
Unity Party 1981-1989 (SAPMO-BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3/3509), Händler is listed in the month of April of 
1983 as having been sent as an envoy to Milan. This suggests, along with this letter, that he acted as a 
representative of the GDR in various contexts. 
122 The first incident included Rochelle Saidel, who at the time was a graduate student. Her interest in 
Ravensbrück culminated in Rochelle G. Saidel, The Jewish Women of Ravensbrück Concentration Camp,  
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004). The second incident Händler referenced regarded Charles 
R. Allen, Jr., a self-proclaimed anti-fascist journalist who worked closely with Rochelle Saidel, 
investigating the escape of Nazi war criminals and similar topics. See for instance Charles R. Allen, Jr. and 
Rochelle Saidel-Wolk, Nazi War Criminals in America: Facts, Action (Albany: C.R. Allen Productions, 
1981). 
123 MGR/SBG RAI/3-5 K VI, 101. 
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artists, and writers.124 In other words, the boundaries of the acceptable had been widened. 
Even the history of the Third Reich could afford new insights, even if here, because of 
this past’s centrality to the legitimacy of antifascism and the GDR itself, the regime still 
exerted tight controls. 
  This increased tolerance allowed historians more leeway. Academics with an eye 
to the work across the border had begun to see the need for approaching their research in 
a new light. The gap in quality between scholarship in the GDR and the West had 
become glaringly obvious and problematic.125 Inspired by the innovations of their 
Western colleagues and utilizing increased academic freedoms, some East German 
historians did in fact accomplish a differentiation of the antifascist master narrative.126 
Thus more nuanced works appeared on previously ignored or marginalized topics such as 
bourgeois resistance to the Nazis and the extermination of Jews. Klaus Drobisch’s 1973 
book Juden unterm Hakenkreuz became one of the first studies entirely dedicated to the 
Holocaust.127 The racial component of National Socialism, and its great importance in the 
                                                
124 In December of 1971, Honecker announced to the Central Committee that as long as socialism remained 
the firm basis of a work, there should be no taboos. Of course, censorship and restrictions remained, but 
nevertheless a slight thaw had begun.  
125 For more on this, see Martin Sabrow, “Dictatorship as Discourse. Cultural Perspectives on SED 
Legitimacy,” in Dictatorship as Experience: Towards a Socio-Cultural History of the GDR, ed. Konrad 
Jarausch, (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), 195-211. 
126 GDR historians had become aware of the methodological innovations occurring in Western historical 
writing. This included the developing fields of women’s and gender history, which some tried to 
incorporate into their own research. Sigrid Jacobeit, Interview by author. Berlin, Germany, July 3, 2012. 
For examples of some of the West German studies that East German historians were taking note of, see 
Gerda Zorn, Widerstand in Hannover: Gegen Reaktion u. Faschismus 1920-1946 (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Röderberg-Verlag, 1977) and Hanna Elling, Frauen im deutschen Widerstand, 1933-45 (Frankfurt a.M., 
Röderberg-Verlag, 1981).Sigrid Jacobeit, Interview by author. Berlin, Germany, July 3, 2012. 
127 Klaus Drobisch, Juden unterm Hakenkreuz. Verfolgung und Ausrottung der deutschen Juden 1933-1945 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Röderberg-Verlag, 1973). 
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politics of Hitler and the Nazi regime, began to be understood.128 A greater tolerance for 
these topics could be detected, as even PhD students were given permission to research 
on Jewish victims.129 
In the case of Ravensbrück, Dr. Sigrid Jacobeit and Dr. Lieselotte Thoms-
Heinrich’s 1987 Kreuzweg Ravensbrück profiled hitherto unknown female prisoners.130 
The biography seemed a less-politicized realm granting more freedom for the authors to 
focus on the varied experiences of the women, even though the Central Committee of the 
SED needed to approve of the final list of proposed biographies.131 This emphasis on 
individual identity allowed for slight departures from the “antifascist resistance fighter” 
trope. Women who had not been communists but were nevertheless progressive or had 
fiercely opposed the regime on religious or political grounds should be recognized, 
Kreuzweg Ravensbrück implied.  
Ostpolitik influenced more than just East German culture. The improved relations 
with the West and desire for international recognition on the part of the SED required a 
moderation in the regime’s rhetoric and policies. This is particularly true once the GDR 
began seeking financial support from its western rival. In other words, the criticisms from 
abroad carried more weight and were no longer dismissed outright, as the SED earnestly 
                                                
128 See for instance Kurt Pätzold, ed, Verfolgung, Vertreibung, Vernichtung. Dokumente des faschistischen 
Antisemitismus 1933 bis 1942 (Leipzig: Reclam, 1983).  
129 See for instance Christine Schlaefer and Frank Schröder, “Jüdische Häftlinge im 
Frauenkonzentrationslager Ravensbrück (1937/39-1942)” (PhD diss., Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 
1987). 
130 Sigrid Jacobeit and Lieselotte Thoms-Heinrich, eds., Kreuzweg Ravensbrück: Lebensbilder 
antifaschistischer Widerstandskampferinnen (Leipzig: Verlag für die Frau, 1987). Because Jacobeit had 
never joined the SED, she needed to publish with Thoms-Heinrich. Sigrid Jacobeit, Interview by author, 
Berlin, Germany, July 3, 2012. 
131 Dr. Jacobeit recalled that this as the “era of the biographies,” which continued after reunification and for 
the time was quite innovative and different from the typical publications. Sigrid Jacobeit, Interview by 
author, Berlin, Germany, July 3, 2012. 
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evaluated the international climate. This is reflected in the letter by Werner Händler and 
indeed is evidence of the increased awareness on the part of the regime toward the 
admonishment from West German and American intellectuals who decried the GDR’s 
inadequate commemoration of the Holocaust and attitude toward Jewish issues. 
This led to a widening of the pantheon of antifascist heroes, as new interest in the 
Jewish past and culture emerged in the 1980’s. For instance, in Berlin the city began to 
renovate and promote former Jewish sites such as the “New Synagogue” on 
Oranienburgerstrasse. The head of state, Erich Honecker, may have been responding to 
critical reports in the West over neglected Jewish cultural sites in East Berlin when he 
vowed to renovate this ruinous structure in the late 1980s, a project which would be 
completed after German reunification.132 Though historians and individual activists had 
already turned their attention to the overlooked history of the Jews in Germany, now the 
SED intervened.133 Kreuzweg Ravensbrück illustrates this development. By the time of 
the book’s writing, the regime had insisted that in each publication or collection of 
biographies, one Jew needed to be included. The regime preferred Jews who were 
politically active, so-called Aushängejuden or “model Jews.” In the case of Kreuzweg 
Ravensbrück, this was the communist activist Rosa Menzer. 134  
                                                
132 For more on the Jewish sites and their histories in the GDR in Berlin, see Michael Meng, Shattered 
Spaces: Encountering Jewish Ruins in Postwar Germany and Poland (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2011). 
133 As Michael Meng has shown, the preservation of Jewish sites had fallen to concerned citizens who out 
of their own initiative had attempted to push the government into action. See Michael Meng, “East 
Germany’s Jewish Question: The Return and Preservation of Jewish Sites in East Berlin and Potsdam, 
1945-1989,” in Central European History, Vol. 38, No. 4 (2005): 606-636. 
134 Sigrid Jacobeit wanted to write on relatively unknown women. Therefore, initially she proposed 
Hermann Axen’s mother-in-law. The Central Committee rejected this, however.  Besides the Jewish 
biography that had been ordered, the Central Committee developed a sort of quota system. Thus, one 
prisoner needed to have been convicted because of their Christian beliefs, another woman had to come 
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This creeping liberalization had come too late for the 1984 museum. This exhibit 
therefore did not reflect the greater toleration for subjects beyond the communist 
resistance. It also contained a multitude of errors and inaccuracies; the captions and 
citations of exhibit photos were incorrect, and in fact often times the images were not 
even from Ravensbrück, the director of the memorial complained in a status report one 
year after the museum’s opening. Additionally, the male camp was nonexistent in the 
memorial’s commemoration. The report attributed many of these oversights to the fact 
that the understaffed memorial lacked the time to review the literature appearing abroad, 
so that the site threatened to fall behind international standards. In general, the director 
warned, the memorial lacked an “international character”; foreign visitors continually 
criticized the political and ideological tone, the lack of differentiation on topics such as 
the role of the Western Allies in the war and the experiences of Christians and Jews.135 In 
general, the annual reports beginning in the early 1980s continually emphasized such 
repeated criticism from visitors from abroad.136 
The deficits and foreign pressure prompted, therefore, a reform of the memorial 
almost immediately after the new museum had opened its doors. The director seized upon 
the KdAW’s suggestion of including a room designated for the racial victims of 
Ravensbrück in the prison building. The renovation of the national commemoration 
rooms, unchanged since 1959, was the memorial’s next major project between 1985 and 
                                                                                                                                            
from bourgeois circles. Jehovah’s Witnesses remained one of the main groups which continued to be a 
taboo subject. Sigrid Jacobeit, Interview by author, Berlin, Germany, July 3, 2012. 
135 SAPMO-BArch DR1/7178, 254. 
136 These were framed as statements of fact and in a tone that suggested the ignorance of the visitors. 
Nevertheless, the reports continually passed on criticisms and assessments on how foreign guests viewed 
the site and the history portrayed there. 
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1987. The director of the memorial proposed on August 8, 1985 that the “Germany Cell” 
offered an opportunity to “especially commemorate” a diversity of prisoner groups, 
particularly Jews and Sinti and Roma.137 When the room opened in 1987, a large 
inscription proclaimed: “In commemoration of the women, children, and men imprisoned 
in the fascist concentration camp Ravensbrück, of whom many fell victim to terror, 
among them communists, social democrats, union members, Christians, patriots, 
bourgeois democrats, victims of fascist racial fanaticism against Jews, Sinti and 
Roma.”138  
The pursuit of a more pluralized memory continued. Sometime in 1988, the 
memorial inaugurated the plaque on the mass grave of Ravensbrück, discussed several 
years beforehand.139 In November of that year, on the 50th anniversary of the 
“Kristallnacht” pogroms, the memorial held the first ceremony publically honoring the 
Jewish victims of Ravensbrück. Non-state entities—such as international peace 
organizations, church groups, and elements of the GDR’s growing dissident movement—
prepared ceremonies at the memorial that attempted to realize new forms of 
commemoration. A “grass-roots” antifascism which demanded a greater breadth lay at 
                                                
137 SAPMO-BArch DR1/7178, 87. The director also suggested that Jehovah’s Witnesses could perhaps be 
included, but that this needed to be “verified.” 
138 Despite this, the “Germany Cell” was not free of controversy. The design proposal expressed the 
concern over the fact that two Germanys existed, so that a commemoration avoiding a suggestion of any 
commonality would have to be avoided. This included avoiding the use of the German flag’s colors, which 
both states shared. When West Germany asked that it receive its own room in 1986, the plans for the cell 
fell through. Instead, the final exhibit was known as the “International Memorial Room.”  
139 Neither the memorial today nor any of the literature can definitively say when the plaque was placed. It 
seems likely, however, that it was around 1988. It is also unclear why this process took several years. 
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the heart of many of these initiatives. Ravensbrück staff recalled the late 1980s as marked 
by a sense of movement and departure, as the “beginning of a new era.”140 
These developments echo the growing discontent in the German population and 
the unraveling of state control. The inadequacy for state propagated antifascism to 
promote identity with the regime and the increasing pressures from “below” and outside 
the GDR forced the SED to concede and tolerate the differentiation of the antifascist 
narrative at Ravensbrück. In addition, the “subjective” antifascism of critical intellectuals 
began to work its way into the ranks of those hitherto loyal to the party line, as the 
involvement of the KdAW and the Ministry for Culture at the memorial testifies. This left 
the regime in an impossible situation of trying to maintain the master narrative. Indeed, 
the decrees and involvement of the SED in the reforms suggest that in this way, they 
were trying to direct and control the liberalization. A struggle to balance limited 
democratization and necessary reform, as well as continue to ensure the survival of the 
East German state, developed. 
The growing presence of non-state groups and foreign visitors made the memorial 
a fluid site. Short of drastically putting on the brakes, the upper echelons of the SED 
simply needed to tolerate this situation. The palpable concern of party conservatives finds 
reflection, however, with the increased engagement of the party’s “shield and sword” at 
the memorial. The Ministry for Security or Stasi increased its surveillance, reacting to the 
pluralization of memory and commemoration at Ravensbrück. 
Regular reports from Stasi operatives detailed the activities at the memorial and 
all suspicious behavior. Of particular interest were foreign visitors or delegations, as well 
                                                
140 Citied in Eschenbach, “Jahrestage,” 93. 
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as individual groups from whom provocative behavior could be expected. For instance, in 
1986 the Stasi learned of the plans of a group of homosexual women belonging to an East 
German church group to lay a wreath at the mass grave at Ravensbrück. The Stasi had 
already noted the group’s “provocative attitude” during the ceremony marking the 40th 
anniversary of the camp’s liberation the year before. Stasi operatives prepared wreaths 
that could be laid over those of the women as soon as they departed the memorial. The 
agents also placed a guestbook that was nearly filled except for a few pages on display, 
so that in the event that one of these women would write something, the book could be 
pulled out of circulation under the excuse that it was filled.141 Seeing public 
commemoration as an opportunity for independent expression, the Stasi’s measures kept 
the existence of various social groups like lesbians invisible at Ravensbrück. 
The Stasi increased its activities here particularly during anniversary celebrations, 
when thousands of attendees could be expected. For instance, 24 agents monitored the 
activities of visitors during the 25th anniversary of the memorial’s opening.142 Generally, 
however, the security apparatus relied on “unofficial collaborators” who reported 
suspicious activity at the memorial, such as “negative” entries in the guest book.143 The 
evidence suggests that several memorial staff members cooperated with the Stasi.144 
                                                
141 Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen der Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik (BStU) AST Potsdam AKG 510, 24-31. 
142 BStU AST Potsdam AKG 510, 9-23. 
143 A suspicious individual had lamented that the museum contained too much ideology, closing his 
statement by drawing a Star of David and writing “Long live capitalism/Let’s go West,” alluding to the 
tagline of West cigarettes, a popular brand in West Germany. The guestbook was removed and dusted for 
fingerprints, as well as sent on for further analysis. BStU AST Potsdam AKG 510, 6-7. 
144 I theorize that the informant mentioned in many of these Stasi reports was the penultimate director of the 
site, Egon Litschke. Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter or “unofficial collaborators” could actually choose their own 
codenames. As the collaborator “Doktor” frequently exhibits that he or she was in a position of authority in 
the memorial, it is plausible that it was the director.  
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Ultimately, although the dogmatic antifascism as endorsed by the SED survived 
until the end of the GDR, the developments at Ravensbrück reflected broader currents in 
GDR society. After March 1990, the first freely elected East German parliament called 
for a “revolutionary renewal” of the GDR, prompting plans for a critical assessment of 
the memorial and its museum. Reunification in the fall of 1990, however, prevented the 
reformatory trends at Ravensbrück. A panel of experts concluded that the memorial 
should be closed and the museum completely renewed in order to transmit an objective 
history of the site.   
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
 It remains pure speculation whether the reformers in the GDR could have realized 
the “new era” that they envisioned. Perhaps the growing changes within the Ravensbrück 
memorial would eventually have achieved some of the developments which occurred 
after reunification. In the prison building, for instance, the memorial—now under the 
direction of Sigrid Jacobeit—dedicated three new rooms to the Jews, the Sinti and Roma, 
and the victims of the 20 July conspiracy.145 Arguably, the developments of the 1980s 
had been building to this already.    
It was one thing for the SED to tolerate a modicum of change in the form of 
plaques and more inclusive rhetoric. It was another to have allowed a complete renewal 
of the antifascist narrative, as it would have utterly undermined the party and state’s 
legitimacy. Thus, it required the dethronement of the SED in order to accomplish the type 
of democratized commemoration that was enshrined in the memorial after 1990. 
Nevertheless, judging GDR memory culture entirely on the basis of “decreed” 
antifascism, as is often the case, limits an understanding of East German memory. This 
reduces everything to the intention of the party and attributes to the memorials an 
influence on East German society that, in light of the evidence, must be regarded with 
skepticism. The efficiency of the SED’s socialist consciousness building is called into 
                                                
145 These opened in 1992, 1995, and 1991 respectively.  
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question by the antifascist convictions which existed “below” the state-propagated 
version that seemingly dominated public discourse.  
There is no denying that the party remained the final arbiter of the memorial’s 
antifascist narrative and exerted control until the crumbling of the East German state. The 
SED needed the memorials of the GDR, as they projected the core values upon which the 
party’s rule rested. This ideology promoted identification with the state and called upon 
visitors to uphold the ideals of socialism by emulating their forbearers who had suffered 
under Nazism. These messages defined East Germany and made the difference between it 
and the West clear, justifying the critical disposition toward the “class enemies” who had 
not overcome the burden of the fascist past. 
This state ideology, however, was the result of a streamlining of the narrative in 
the early postwar period that expunged deviating positions. In other words, the SED 
forged and pushed their antifascism in the face of contestation from intellectuals and 
camp survivors, who accommodated a number of voices from other social groups who 
had a shared experience of Nazi persecution. The establishment of the Ravensbrück 
memorial coincided with the regime’s domination of the master narrative and represented 
the culmination of this purging process. This “official” version remained virtually 
unchanged, until creeping reforms in the decade before reunification saw the 
reemergence of a pluralized antifascism that sought to include disparate voices. 
 As the developments of the 1980s make clear, this benefitted particularly 
Ravensbrück’s racial victims. The reforms also made possible histories that focused on 
the individual identity of the prisoners and elaborated on their camp experiences, 
“rescuing” women from the rigid and monolithic master narrative. This laid the 
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groundwork that allowed historians such as Sigrid Jacobeit to bring a wider 
understanding of the women and the diverse social groups to the forefront of the 
memorial after reunification.146 But a fundamental challenge to the gendered antifascism 
before the emergence and full application of women’s and gender history remained 
unthinkable. 
Thus, Ravensbrück’s political messages remained gendered. The antifascist 
narrative here often addressed a feminine audience and the sculptures at the site 
embodied different qualities from male figures at the other camps. The museum also told 
a history of the camp’s women that was problematic on two levels. First, it privileged 
communist heroines and mythologized their resistance, thereby excluding other social 
groups. In this sense, Ravensbrück did not differ from the other GDR memorials. 
Secondly, however, Ravensbrück’s definition of resistance relied on the notion of 
motherhood and other qualities attributed to femininity.  
Although Ravensbrück was one of three national memorials, the survivors and 
staff members continually felt that it stood in the shadow of Buchenwald and 
Sachsenhausen. This can be attributed to the communist functionaries who had entered 
the SED after the war. Because even in socialist East Germany the government was male-
dominated, an over-representation of Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen survivors 
controlled the regime. These men fashioned the antifascist narrative and influenced 
public discourse, so that the memory of female experience faded into the background. 
Furthermore, the male camps did not solely rank supreme in public memory because 
party luminaries had been imprisoned there, but rather because they fit the antifascist 
                                                
146 For more on Sigrid Jacobeit’s work at the memorial, see Hördler, Der Nationalsozialismus im Spiegel 
des öffentlichen Gedächtnisses, especially 287-353. 
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narrative more conveniently. The masculine rhetoric of struggle and resistance privileged 
male survivors.  
Overall, in form and in the specific narratives of the women’s experience, the 
Ravensbrück memorial differed significantly from Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen. In 
function, however, all sites shared the common purpose of legitimizing the ruling party 
and the East German state. In that regard, Ravensbrück also upheld the SED’s 
antifascism. In the official rhetoric the prisoners here as well shared in the legacy of the 
communist resistance, so that the generic maxims of socialist solidarity and peace 
remained stable from one memorial to the next.  
The “subjective” antifascism that critics exhibited throughout the history of the 
GDR were the result of introspection on the part of individuals, as the case of 
Ravensbrück indicates. However, Western historical writing and political pressure had a 
profound influence, particularly in the 1980s. For one, the increased exposure to these 
academic standards and nuanced commemoration introduced new ideas that called the 
strict party line into question. Much of the reform thus came about from the political and 
scholarly desire to impress Western progressives and match their standards. Moreover, 
Ostpolitik and increased normalization of relations with the West allowed for greater 
cultural exchange so that the GDR’s deficits in memory culture became embarrassing 
political and moral liabilities. In order to gain political capitol and recognition, the regime 
needed to tolerate and even promoted limited reform. This created the spaces that allowed 
for a differentiation of the history of Ravensbrück and the commemoration of many of its 
marginalized victims. 
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The increasing nuances as exhibited in Ravensbrück came from intellectuals who 
no longer subscribed to the antifascist historical narrative. This did not necessarily signal 
disenchantment with socialism, but rather a declining identity with the ideology as 
prescribed by the SED. Their “subjective” antifascism thus criticized the communist 
master narrative in order to improve it. Historians and intellectuals thus found 
commemorating previously marginalized victim groups—such as Jews, Sinti and Roma, 
non-political prisoners, and members of non-communist parties—not only morally 
correct, but also in the spirit of antifascism. As the historian Annette Leo pointed out in 
1987 in her calls for increased commemoration of members of the 20 July plot, 
remembering overlooked victims would result in a better, more comprehensive 
fulfillment of the legacy of the opposition to Hitler.147  
As the case of Ravensbrück shows, a balanced assessment of the sites of public 
memory within the former GDR lead to paradoxical and complicated conclusions. These 
memorials to the victims of the Third Reich have become places where the history of the 
East German dictatorship is encountered and contested. The SED’s restrictive antifascist 
narrative makes white-washing the authoritarian nature of this now defunct state morally 
dubious and impossible. But it would also be an error to insist on depictions of repression 
and fixate on the short-comings of East German memory culture. Neither view is 
historically correct and prohibits a meaningful understanding of GDR history. 
Furthermore, the limited liberalization occurred shortly before the collapse of the regime 
illuminates the broader social currents within East German society. The ambivalences 
echoed at Ravensbrück reflect the larger social and political reforms that ultimately 
                                                
147 MGR/SBG RAI/3-5 K XXXXIV, 2. 
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contributed to the surprising and sudden collapse of the German Democratic Republic in 
1989, and give a new insight into the “demarcation and entanglement” of German 
history.148  
  
                                                
148 Christoph Kleßmann, “Abgrenzung und Verflechtung. Aspekte der geteilten und zusammengehörigen 
deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte,” APuZ (1995): 29-30. 
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APPENDIX 
FIGURE 1 
 
View from southwest toward the camp wall and the crematorium. Behind the crematorium stands the 
Zellenbau or prison block. Photographed by author in 2007. 
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Figure 2 
 
View from crematorium toward south. Pictured are the bed of roses and mass grave, established circa 1948, 
and the “Wall of Nations.” The two stones in the foreground commemorate the victims of Nazi racial 
persecution. The stone on the left, inaugurated in the early 1990s, honors the Sinti and Roma of 
Ravensbrück. The stone on the right, placed presumably in 1988, reads: “In honor of the countless Jewish 
and other victims of fascist racial fanaticism.” Photographed by author in 2007. 
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Figure 3 
 
“Buchenwald Group” by Fritz Cremer, inaugurated in 1958. Photographed by the author in 2007. 
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Figure 4 
Müttergruppe by Fritz Cremer, inaugurated at the camp entrance in 1965. Photographed by the author  
in 2008. 
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Figure 5 
 
Die Tragende by Will Lammert, inaugurated at the opening of the Ravensbrück Memorial in 1957. 
Photographed by author in 2008. 
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Figure 6 
 
Sculpture in the Grosse Hamburger Strasse. Depicted are 13 figures which originally were meant for the 
base of Die Tragende. These were instead used in 1985 for a memorial to Berlin’s Jewish victims who 
perished in the Holocaust, located at the former home for the Jewish elderly on Grosse Hamburger Strasse. 
Photographed by author in 2012. 
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